Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant Dale Hausner was convicted and sentenced to death for six murders. Defendant was also convicted and sentenced for seventy-four non-capital offenses. The convictions stemmed from a series of random shootings in the Phoenix area between June 2005 and August 2006 in which Defendant murdered six pedestrians or bicyclists, several dogs, and, allegedly, a horse. The Supreme Court (1) reversed Defendant's conviction and sentence for one count of animal cruelty, holding that the evidence was not sufficient for a jury to reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant shot a horse; and (2) otherwise affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences.

The issue presented here was whether the superior court must hold an evidentiary hearing when the results of a postconviction DNA testing conducted under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-4240 are favorable to the petitioner. A jury found Petitioner guilty of second-degree murder. Petitioner's conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. Petitioner later successfully petitioned the superior court for DNA testing. The test results were favorable to Defendant. Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief and requested an evidentiary hearing. The superior court denied postconviction relief. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's order, holding that under section 13-4240(K), a court faced with favorable DNA test results, but no material issues of fact, must hold a non-evidentiary hearing to permit the parties to argue why the petitioner should or should not be entitled to relief as a matter of law. Remanded.

Defendant was indicted for first degree murder, illegal discharge of a firearm, and aggravated assault. At trial, the judge sua sponte instructed the jury on second degree murder over Defendant's objection and on manslaughter over the objections of Defendant and the State. The jury acquitted Defendant of first degree murder and was unable to reach a verdict on second degree murder but found Defendant guilty of manslaughter. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on aggravated assault but found Defendant guilty on the firearms charge. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred by giving the manslaughter instruction over the objections of both parties. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) if a lesser included offense instruction is given and supported by the evidence, a resultant conviction for the lesser included offense does not violate the defendant's constitutional rights or contravene any Arizona statute or rule; and (2) because the manslaughter instruction in this case was supported by the evidence, Defendant's conviction must stand.

Defendant was detained by police during a stolen vehicle investigation. Defendant moved to suppress statements he made confessing to the crime, arguing that his initial detention was not supported by reasonable suspicion and, alternatively, that the initial detention had become a de facto arrest unsupported by probable cause before he was interrogated. The State countered that although there was no probable cause to arrest until Defendant made incriminating statements, the detention never became a de facto arrest. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court granted review to consider relevant factors in determining when a lawful detention becomes a de facto arrest. The Court vacated the court of appeals and held that the lack of evidence that officers acted diligently in investigating the matter and that the continuing use of handcuffs when there was no ongoing safety threat or flight risk transformed the valid Terry stop into a de facto arrest before Defendant was questioned by an auto theft detective. Remanded.

Ariz. Rev. Stat 8-238 requires juveniles charged with certain offenses and summoned to appear at an advisory hearing to submit to the investigating law enforcement agency a sample of buccal cells or other bodily substances for DNA testing and extraction. The penalty for failure to comply is revocation of release pending adjudication. In this case seven juveniles were separately charged with violations of offenses specified in section 8-238(A). Each was summoned to an advisory hearing, released, and ordered to submit a buccal sample to law enforcement within five days. In each case, the superior court rejected Fourth Amendment objections to the sampling order. The Juveniles jointly filed a special action in the court of appeals, which held that requiring the submission of DNA samples from juveniles for whom a probable cause determination has been made does not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals, holding that the statutory scheme violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.

This automatic appeal arose from Defendant's 2009 death sentences for the 1996 murders of Thomas Hardman and Carol Lynn Noel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that (1) the trial court did not err by allowing the State to offer evidence during the penalty phase of the felony murders when he did not present any mitigating evidence; (2) the trial court did not violate Defendant's rights under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the federal and state Constitution by refusing to grant a pretrial evidentiary hearing on Defendant's motion to dismiss on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct; (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to introduce photographs of the crime scenes showing the victims' bodies; and (4) Defendant's death sentences were appropriate.

Gary Gipson was indicted for first degree murder, illegal discharge of a firearm, and aggravated assault. At trial, the judge sua sponte instructed the jury on second degree murder over Gipson's objection and on manslaughter over the objections of both Gipson and the State. The jury found Gipson guilty of manslaughter and illegal discharge of a firearm. On appeal, Gipson conceded that the evidence supported the manslaughter instruction, but he argued that the trial court erred by giving it over the objections of both parties. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, although a judge should hesitate to give the instruction over objections from the defense and the prosecution, it was not reversible error in this case to do so.

After a jury trial, Brad Nelson was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The jury found proven beyond a reasonable doubt the only aggravator alleged under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-751(F)(9), that Nelson was an adult and the victim was under fifteen years old at the time of the murder. The Supreme Court affirmed Nelson's conviction and sentence, holding (1) Nelson was not deprived of a fair and impartial jury; (2) the jury's finding of premeditation was not legally incorrect; (3) the premeditation instruction given to the jury was not fundamentally erroneous, nor did the prosecutor incorrectly argue premeditation; (4) the section 13-751(F)(9) aggravator was constitutional; (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Nelson's motion for mistrial based on an improper argument by the prosecutor; and (6) the jury did not abuse its discretion in determining that Nelson should be sentenced to death.

Patrick Ferrero was charged with three counts of sexual conduct with a minor. The trial court admitted evidence of "other uncharged acts" with the minor. The judge did not screen the evidence under Ariz. R. Evid. 404(c), which permits "other act" evidence to prove the defendant's propensity to commit the charged offense, but only if the court makes specific findings. The court of appeals reversed Ferrero's convictions on two counts, holding that the trial judge erred in failing to screen the evidence of Ferrero's prior sexual conduct with the minor - State v. Garner evidence - under Rule 404(c). At issue before the Supreme Court was whether evidence of similar sexual contact with the same minor victim is "intrinsic evidence" that is not governed by Rule 404(c). The Court vacated the court of appeals and remanded the case for a new trial on the first two counts, holding (1) Rule 404(c) does not apply to truly intrinsic evidence, but Garner evidence is not inherently intrinsic; and (2) because the evidence in this case was offered to prove Ferrero's propensity to commit the charged act, the trial court erred in admitting evidence of that act without screening it under Rule 404(c).

After a jury trial, Pete VanWinkle was found guilty of attempted murder and other offenses. VanWinkle appealed, arguing that the trial court violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by admitting evidence of his post-custody, pre-Miranda silence, and the prosecutorial comment on it. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Miranda did not apply because there was no police interrogation. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals but affirmed VanWinkle's convictions and sentences, holding (1) the admission of post-custody, pre-Miranda silence and prosecutorial comment on such silence violates a defendant's constitutional right to remain silent; but (2) the error in this case was harmless.