Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After a police officers had a consensual encounter with Defendant, they asked Defendant if he had any firearms. Defendant replied that he had a gun. The officers then frisked Defendant, removed the gun, and arrested Defendant as a prohibited possessor of a firearm. Defendant moved to suppress the gun as the fruit of an unconstitutional search. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that once the officers became aware that Defendant had a gun, they were allowed to remove the gun and conduct a pat down for safety purposes. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s conviction and sentence, holding that, during an initially consensual encounter with an individual, an officer must have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot before frisking the individual. View "State v. Serna" on Justia Law

Appellant was placed on probation. Appellant’s appointed counsel filed a notice of appeal. The Office of the Public Defender assigned the case to an attorney. Appellant informed the trial court, as well as her attorney, that she wished to represent herself on appeal, but her requests were ignored. Appellant’s counsel then filed a motion with the court of appeals seeking leave for Appellant to represent herself. The court of appeals denied the motion, concluding that although there was no constitutional right to self-representation on appeal, self-representation was permitted if the request was timely, and Appellant’s request was untimely. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ decision, holding (1) the Arizona Constitution provides a defendant with a right to self-representation on appeal, and (2) the request for self-representation on appeal must be made no later than thirty days after the filing of the notice of appeal. Remanded. View "Coleman v. Hon. Johnsen" on Justia Law

In 2006, the City of Phoenix started installing light rail tracks along Jefferson Street, which abutted Appellant’s property. As part of the installation, the City erected a permanent concrete barrier between the tracks and Appellant’s property, thus blocking two driveways providing vehicular access from Jefferson Street to Appellant’s property. The property, however, still had access via Madison Street. The City subsequently filed an eminent domain action to determine the compensation it owed to Appellant for a temporary construction easement Appellant granted the City. Appellant counterclaimed, seeking damages for his permanent loss of access to Jefferson Street. The superior court granted summary judgment to the City on that claim, concluding that a property owner is not entitled to compensation for loss of access if he retains “free and convenient access” to the property. The court of appeals vacated the superior court’s ruling, concluding that the government may not eliminate a property owner’s established access to an abutting roadway without providing just compensation to the property owner. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under these circumstances, an owner may claim compensable damage to private property within the meaning of Ariz. Const. art. II, 17, even if other streets provide access to the property. View "City of Phoenix v. Garretson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of two counts of first degree murder for stabbing his pregnant girlfriend, killing her and the unborn baby. Appellant was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions and death sentences, holding that the trial court did not (1) err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress his post-arrest confession; (2) err in striking a juror for cause; (3) err in screening and limiting questions used in a written questionnaire sent to prospective jurors; (4) err in precluding or limiting the testimony of three defense witnesses; (5) commit fundamental error by allowing evidence of statements Appellant made four years before the murders; (6) abuse its discretion in finding that the State’s mental health expert qualified as an expert in intellectual disability and in therefore allowing the expert to testify on the issue of Appellant’s intellectual ability; and (7) violate Appellant’s right to counsel by not declaring a mistrial based on the alleged ineffectiveness of Appellant’s trial attorneys. In addition, the jury did not abuse its discretion in finding aggravating circumstances and in determining that death was the appropriate sentence. View "State v. Naranjo" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree felony murder and six other felonies for offenses committed during a home invasion. The trial court imposed death sentences for the murders and prison sentences totaling seventy-five years for the non-capital counts. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences but ordered that her sentences for armed robbery and aggravated robbery run concurrently, holding, among other things, that (1) the trial court did not commit reversible error in granting Defendant’s motion for a change of venue based on extensive media coverage of the crimes, deciding its rulings regarding jury selection, and instructing the jury; (2) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct; and (3) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences for robbery and aggravated robbery because these crimes were based on a single act by Defendant. View "State v. Forde" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of five counts of first degree murder, among other charges, and sentenced to death for each murder. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences, holding (1) Defendant was not deprived of his right to a speedy trial; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by consolidating the murder and solicitation of first degree murder charges; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting into evidence certain victims’ recorded statements; (4) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for mistrial; (5) the trial court did not err in admitting a forensic firearms expert’s testimony; (6) substantial evidence supported the solicitation convictions; (7) the trial court did not err in its jury instructions; (8) and substantial evidence supported the jury’s findings of aggravating circumstances and the imposition of the death sentences. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and thirty counts of attempted first degree murder following a shooting spree at a homeowners' association meeting in 2000. Appellant was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on appeal. In 2010, Appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The petition was pending when Appellant died in 2013. The superior court subsequently dismissed Appellant's post-conviction relief proceeding as well as his indictment and conviction under State v. Griffin, in which the Supreme Court held that when a convicted defendant dies before his direct appeal is decided, the prosecution is abated from the outset, and the conviction is set aside. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's judgment, holding that the doctrine of abatement ab initio set forth in Griffin does not apply when a defendant dies after his conviction is affirmed but while post-conviction relief proceedings are pending. View "State v. Glassel" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with four felonies relating to an assault. After Defendant agreed to plead guilty to a lesser charge, he admitted at a change-of-plea hearing that he was an accomplice. Later Defendant denied any involvement. The trial court subsequently rejected the plea agreement. During the trial proceedings, Defendant moved to prevent the State from using statements he made during the change-of-plea hearing. The trial court ruled that the State could impeach Defendant with his statements if he testified inconsistently with them at trial. Defendant did not testify at trial, and the jury found him guilty on all counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court erred in ruling the State could use Defendant's change-of-plea statements to impeach him; but (2) Defendant could not raise the trial court's error on appeal because a defendant must testify to preserve a challenge to a ruling permitting the use of evidence for impeachment. View "State v. Duran" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, armed robbery, first degree burglary, kidnapping, and theft of a means of transportation. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death for the murder conviction and to prison sentences totaling forty-two years for the other convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring a mistrial and later denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the State's allegation that Defendant should be sentenced to death; (2) the statutes governing the death penalty are not unconstitutionally vague; (3) there is not an unconstitutional presumption of death in Arizona's death penalty statutes; and (4) the jury did not abuse its discretion in imposing the death sentence in this case. View "State v. Reeves" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, third degree robbery, and aggravated robbery. Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder. A few years later, the trial court vacated the sentence, finding that Defendant's defense counsel was inefficient. Because the jury could not agree on a sentence at the resentencing trial, the judge declared a mistrial. After a second penalty phase trial, the jury determined Defendant should be sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's death sentence, holding, inter alia, that (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's second petition for post-conviction relief and his motion to suppress; (2) the statutory provision for retrial after a hung penalty-phase jury does not result in cruel and unusual punishment; (3) the trial court did not err in its decisions regarding the jury or the jury instructions; (4) the application of the 2009 version of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-752(G) in Defendant's case did not violate the ex post facto clause; (5) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct; and (6) based on the aggravating and mitigating circumstances present in this case, the mitigation was not sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency. View "State v. Medina" on Justia Law