Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

This appeal presented the question of whether the Alaska State Commission for Human Rights (the Commission) must interview one or more witnesses identified by a complainant before dismissing a complaint for lack of substantial evidence to support a discrimination claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the statutory duty to impartially investigate implied that the Commission must make a reasonable effort to interview at least some of the witnesses identified by a complainant where it appears that they may have relevant information. The Court also concluded that this duty was not satisfied under the facts of this case because the Commission did not interview any of the witnesses identified by the complainant even though they potentially had relevant information.

58-year-old Asian-American Appellant Sue Grundberg alleged that she was discriminated against when her employer, the Alaska Department of Transportation and Public Facilities, denied her a promotion to the position of Engineer II, and instead hired "a younger less qualified" Caucasian man for the position. She filed a complaint with the State Commission for Human Rights, which initiated an administrative investigation of the hiring decision. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Commission issued a written determination that Appellant had failed to produce substantial evidence of unlawful discrimination by the Department. On appeal, the superior court affirmed the agency determination. Because Appellant produced evidence sufficient to create an inference that the Department's alleged reason for not hiring her is a pretext for discrimination, the Supreme Court reversed.

An adult woman diagnosed with a mental illness appealed her already completed 30-day involuntary commitment to Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API), arguing the evidence did not support the superior court’s findings that: (1) she was likely to cause harm to herself or others due to her mental illness; and (2) API was the least restrictive alternative placement for her. Because Alaska's existing case law provides that an evidentiary-based "weight of the evidence" challenge to a completed involuntary commitment is moot absent accompanying legal issues appropriate for decision under the mootness doctrine's public interest exception, the Supreme Court asked the parties to submit supplemental briefing on mootness. As a result, the Court addressed a question not directly raised in earlier cases: should the Court's application of the mootness doctrine in this context accommodate the importance of collateral consequences arising from an involuntary commitment? The Court answered that question "yes" and therefore reached the merits of this appeal. On the merits, the Court affirmed the superior court's involuntary commitment order.

The parents of a developmentally disabled adult woman appealed a superior court's decision to appoint a public guardian, rather than the parents, as the woman's legal guardian. The superior court found that the parents failed to take advantage of resources available for the daughter's development and did not support the daughter's contact with extended family. On appeal, the parents argued that they should have been appointed as guardians and that the appointment of a public guardian, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the parents were unfit to serve as guardians, violated their constitutional right to parent their child. Because the superior court did not abuse its discretion in appointing the public guardian, and because the superior court's action did not violate the parents' substantive due process rights under the 14th Amendment, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the superior court in all respects.

Appellant Chana Boyko was a teacher who resigned in lieu of termination from the Anchorage School District after violating a "last chance agreement." She alleged the School District breached a resignation agreement in which it promised not to release negative information about her to prospective employers. Appellant sued, claiming that she was terminated as a result of disability discrimination and that the School District's comments made in violation of the resignation agreement breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and interfered with her prospective contractual relations. The superior court granted the School District summary judgment on all claims, concluding that the District had nondiscriminatory reasons for termination and that its comments were protected by statutory immunity. Appellant appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the claims of statutory immunity, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and interference with prospective contractual relations, because there were genuine issues of material fact regarding these claims. The Court affirmed summary judgment on the discrimination claim.

Parents "Madeline P." and "Rex P." challenged a school district's actions regarding their child's educational program under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). A hearing officer found an IDEA violation but awarded less compensatory education services for the child than the parents requested. On appeal, the superior court affirmed the IDEA violation finding and the compensatory education award. The parents appealed, arguing that more compensatory education services should have been awarded; the school district cross-appealed, arguing that no compensatory education services should have been awarded. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's findings regarding the school district's violation of the IDEA's procedural and substantive requirements and the compensatory education award.

Parents requested that the Anchorage School District evaluate their child for eligibility for special education services. While awaiting the results of the eligibility assessment, the parents arranged for private tutoring. The school district did not assess the childâs eligibility within the statutorily-required time, and the parents requested a due process hearing. They also arranged for their child to be privately evaluated to determine whether he was eligible for special education services. The school district subsequently completed its evaluation and determined the child to be ineligible for services. At the due process hearing, the parents alleged that the school district committed procedural violations under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), including impermissibly delaying the evaluation. They sought reimbursement for the cost of their childâs private evaluation and tutoring. An independent hearing officer presided over the due process hearing and ultimately agreed with the district that the child was ineligible for services. The hearing officer ordered the school district to pay the cost of the private eligibility assessment and to partially pay the cost of the tutoring. The superior court upheld the award of the private eligibility assessment, but reversed the award of the private tutoring cost. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the school district argued that the parents should not be reimbursed for the evaluation or the tutoring; the parents argued they are entitled to full reimbursement for both expenses. The central question the Court addressed was: where a child is ultimately determined to be ineligible for special education services, does the IDEA provide relief for procedural violations that occur during the process of evaluating the childâs eligibility for services? The Court affirmed the superior courtâs decision, upholding the independent hearing officerâs award of the private assessment cost, but reversing the hearing officerâs award of the private tutoring expenses.

Appellant Leta Trask painted a religious message on her roof. Appellee Ketchikan Gateway Borough filed a complaint to enjoin Ms. Trask from displaying the message. The Borough argued that the message was in violation of a borough ordinance prohibiting roof signs. Ms. Trask counterclaimed for relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that the Borough's enforcement of the ordinance violated her free speech rights. The superior court held that the message was not a "sign" contemplated by the ordinance and that she did not have to remove it. The court dismissed Ms. Trask's 1983 claim for lack of standing. Ms. Trask appealed the dismissal of her 1983 claim to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the briefs submitted and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that it was error to dismiss Ms. Trask's 1983 claim. The Court reversed the lower court's dismissal, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Appellee Advanced Physical Therapy, Inc. (APT) terminated the employment of Appellant Patricia Hoendermis. She had previously served as the clinicâs practice administrator. APTâs reason for terminating her was that Appellant had difficulty communicating with her co-workers and supervisors. Accordingly, Appellant disagreed with APTâs decision, and sued APT for wrongful termination and for failing to provide her overtime compensation. Appellant maintained that she was not an administrative or executive employee, and was therefore entitled to overtime pay. Furthermore, she alleged APT violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in her employment contract. The Superior Court granted APT summary judgment, and Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court reversed the grant of summary judgment to APT because it found genuine issues of material fact raised by Appellant on both her overtime compensation and wrongful termination claims. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.