Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The respondent in this mental health commitment proceeding argued that the delay between his detention and his involuntary commitment hearing violated time limits imposed by statute and due process of law. After review of the case, the Supreme Court concluded that the relevant statutory time limit began upon a respondent’s arrival at an evaluation facility, that there was no obvious or prejudicial statutory violation in this case, and that the delay in this case did not violate due process. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the respondent’s appeal of his involuntary medication order was moot. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Gabriel C." on Justia Law

Daniel G. appealed an ex parte order authorizing a 72-hour psychiatric evaluation issued after his emergency detention. The evaluation personnel determined that Daniel did not meet the statutory criteria for involuntary commitment, and he was released before the expiration of the 72-hour period. He argued the evaluation order violated his constitutional right to due process because it was issued on an ex parte basis, without notice and a hearing, while he was safely in protective custody. The superior court denied the motion to vacate the evaluation order as moot in light of Daniel’s release. After careful consideration of the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that although Daniel's appeal was moot, the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applied. The Court therefore reached the merits of his due process claim: the 72-hour evaluation order and the statutory evaluation procedures did not violate due process, and the Court affirmed the evaluation order. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Daniel G." on Justia Law

Stephen O.'s parents were concerned that he had suffered a possible psychotic break. They reported his behavior to a mental health clinician. The clinician obtained an ex parte order to take Stephen into custody and transport him to the hospital in Juneau for examination and treatment. The police took him into custody, but due to bad weather he remained in jail for six days before he was transported for evaluation. After a contested hearing, the superior court found by clear and convincing evidence that Stephen was gravely disabled under AS 47.30.915(7)(B) and issued an order for a 30-day involuntary commitment. Stephen appealed that order. Because the superior court’s conclusion that the man was gravely disabled was not supported by clear and convincing evidence, the Supreme Court reversed and vacated the superior court’s 30-day involuntary commitment order. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Stephen O." on Justia Law

The Alaska State Commission for Human Rights dismissed Gregg Conitz's complaint against his employer, Teck Alaska Incorporated. In his complaint, Conitz alleged the company discriminated in its promotion decisions. The superior court dismissed Conitz's appeal as moot, finding that the same claims had already been decided by a federal court and that the doctrine of res judicata precluded further claims if remanded to the Commission. Conitz appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior courts decision. View "Conitz v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights" on Justia Law

Two former police officers brought claims against the Municipality of Anchorage for racial discrimination, alleging a hostile work environment in violation of state law. The officers claimed damages for mental anguish, and the Municipality sought discovery concerning the nature of their mental anguish claims. But the officers refused to comply with these discovery requests, invoking the physician and psychotherapist privilege. The Municipality moved for an order to compel the officers to sign releases authorizing the disclosure of medical, pharmacy, and psychological counseling records, which the superior court granted. The officers then petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the order. Upon review, the Court concluded that the assertion of "garden-variety" mental anguish claims in an employment discrimination case does not automatically waive the physician and psychotherapist privilege. View "Kennedy v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

Appellant Clinton DesJarlais filed an application with the Office of the Lieutenant Governor seeking certification of an initiative that would generally prohibit abortion. The lieutenant governor, acting on the advice of the Department of Law, concluded that the initiative was unconstitutional and declined to certify it for circulation. Appellant filed suit against the State in superior court challenging the lieutenant governor's decision. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the State and appellant appealed. Because appellant's proposed initiative was clearly unconstitutional under controlling United States Supreme Court precedent, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment. View "DesJarlais v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Appellant Mary Hill, the owner of an assisted living home, sought damages from Appellees Linda Giani (an independent care coordinator), the Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) and Staci Collier (a state licensing specialist) for alleged economic harm caused by a Report of Harm filed by Giani, which resulted in the removal of one of Hill's residents and a subsequent investigation conducted by Collier. The superior court granted summary judgment: to DHSS and Collier on Hill's state law tort claims on the basis of immunity; to Collier on Hill's 42 U.S.C. 1983 due process claim because Hill failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Collier's actions deprived her of a constitutional right; and to Giani on the basis of immunity and common law privilege. Hill appealed. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the court's grants of summary judgment to DHSS and Collier based on statutory immunity and to Collier on Hill's 1983 claim. Because the Court found that Hill raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Giani acted in good faith when she filed her Report of Harm, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment to Giani and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hill v. Giani" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the court concerned whether monetary damages are available to a prisoner for violations of the terms of a judicial decree approving the "Cleary Final Settlement Agreement." In 2004 appellee Corrections Corporation of America contracted with the State to house Alaska inmates at Corrections Corporation's Red Rock Correctional Center in Arizona. Byran Perotti was an Alaska inmate at Red Rock. He filed a complaint against Corrections Corporation alleging that Corrections Corporation violated provisions of its contract with the State, as well as various State Department of Corrections policies. He asserted standing as a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the State and Corrections Corporation. He based his argument on his status as a Cleary class member and the provisions of the Cleary Final Settlement Agreement, which settled the class action involving various inmate claims against the State of Alaska, Department of Corrections (DOC). Perotti's complaint sought liquidated damages under the DOC-Corrections Corporation contract, as well as compensatory damages, nominal damages, and punitive damages. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Cleary Final Settlement Agreement did not contemplate the award of monetary damages to enforce its provisions. Therefore the Court affirmed the superior court's decision granting Corrections Corporation's motion for summary judgment and dismissed all of Perotti's claims. View "Perotti v. Corrections Corporation of America" on Justia Law

The State of Alaska dismissed an employee for allegedly submitting a falsified timesheet and claiming full pay for a week when she was not working. The employee argued her dismissal violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because a biased supervisor was involved with the termination decision, because the State's investigation was conducted unfairly, and because she was treated differently from similarly situated employees. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision that there was insufficient evidence to show a breach of the implied covenant on any of these grounds. The Court also affirmed the superior court's ruling that the employee's unfair labor practice claim was untimely and therefore waived.

"Jeffrey E." appealed his 30-day involuntary commitment order, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support the superior court's conclusion that he was gravely disabled. In June 2011 Jeffrey was 20 years old, had recently lost his job due to behavioral difficulties, was in the process of divorcing, and was staying with family members. Jeffrey's family members became concerned about his behavior and brought him to a hospital. Jeffrey's family reported Jeffrey had not been eating, drinking, sleeping, or performing any self-care for several days- " he had more or less remained seated in a catatonic state," to the point of urinating on himself. Jeffrey's family also reported Jeffrey had made comments about others being able to read his mind, had responded aggressively to challenges, and had a family history of mental illness. Because Jeffrey was uncommunicative, hospital staff could not determine if he was actively psychotic. Although unable to articulate how he would behave differently, Jeffrey wanted to go home and "denied thoughts or plans of self harm or harm to others." Hospital staff concluded Jeffrey "may be experiencing symptoms of psychosis but it is difficult to assess" and that "[h]e could benefit from further assessment and stabilization . . . as it is possible he is experiencing psychosis." The superior court granted an ex parte order requiring Jeffrey's transport to Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API) for examination. A few days later API staff filed a petition for an involuntary 30-day commitment, and the court held a hearing on this petition. Because the superior court did not err in concluding that the respondent was gravely disabled under the required clear and convincing evidence standard, the Supreme Court affirmed the 30-day commitment order.