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Labor Code section 244, which does not require a litigant to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a civil action, applies only to claims before the Labor Commissioner. The Court of Appeal explained that section 244 has no effect on Campbell v. Regents of University of California, (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, which held that public employees must pursue appropriate internal administrative remedies before filing a civil action against their employer. In this case, plaintiff appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, the County, in a wrongful termination action. The court held that plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies on her claims that the County terminated her job to discriminate against her; there were no triable issues of fact on plaintiff's claim that she was terminated because of her sexual orientation; and the trial court erred by awarding the County costs on the Fair Employment and Housing Act cause of action. View "Terris v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

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Labor Code section 244, which does not require a litigant to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a civil action, applies only to claims before the Labor Commissioner. The Court of Appeal explained that section 244 has no effect on Campbell v. Regents of University of California, (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, which held that public employees must pursue appropriate internal administrative remedies before filing a civil action against their employer. In this case, plaintiff appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, the County, in a wrongful termination action. The court held that plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies on her claims that the County terminated her job to discriminate against her; there were no triable issues of fact on plaintiff's claim that she was terminated because of her sexual orientation; and the trial court erred by awarding the County costs on the Fair Employment and Housing Act cause of action. View "Terris v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

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The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint that alleged claims related to his termination from the police department. The court held that plaintiff's retaliation claim, on its face, was outside the bounds of the Title VII statute; nothing in plaintiff's complaint or his deposition testimony indicated that he was pursuing a Title VII claim encompassing race-based discrimination and thus he could not submit a claim via an affidavit at the summary judgment stage; and the district court correctly dismissed plaintiff's contract claim where the strain of public policy that plaintiff sought to invoke was simply inapposite to the facts in this case. View "Winfrey v. Forrest City, Arkansas" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of battery and other offenses, holding that the trial court committed structural error in handling Defendant’s invocation of his right to self-representation. At a motions hearing before Defendant’s trial was to begin, Defendant interjected during argument before the court and stated that he wanted it on the record that he was “unequivocally” asserting his right to self-representation. The judge refused to take up the matter of self-representation, telling Defendant that he must file a written motion if he wanted to represent himself. Defendant did not file the motion or otherwise reassert the right to self-representation when court reconvened. The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentence, rejecting Defendant’s claim that he was denied his right to self-representation. The Supreme Court concluded that Defendant was denied his right to self-representation and that the error was structural. The court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "State v. Bunyard" on Justia Law

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After Defendant’s initial sentence was voided for illegality, the district court resentenced Defendant to a new term of imprisonment. The district court originally suspended Defendant’s prison sentence and instead ordered a five-year term of probation. Upon resentencing, the court refused to credit the time Defendant spent on probation pursuant to the initial sentence against the new term of imprisonment. The Supreme Court held that the failure to award credit for the time spent on probation violated Defendant’s constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment. The court held that all time Defendant spent on probation pursuant to the voided sentence must be fully credited against a corrected sentence of incarceration because, when an initial sentence is voided for illegality, any punishments already endured must be credited against the corrected sentence. The dissent disagreed, arguing that probation should not be equated with punishment in the same way incarceration is considered for double jeopardy purposes. View "State v. Jepsen" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit amended an opinion affirming the district court's judgment denying a habeas corpus petition where petitioner sought a custody redetermination as he awaited the outcome of administrative proceedings to determine whether he has a reasonable fear of returning to his native country of El Salvador. The panel held that reinstated removal orders were administratively final for detention purposes, and that the detention of aliens subject to reinstated removal orders was governed by 8 U.S.C. 1231(a), rather than section 1226(a). Therefore, petitioner was not entitled to a bond hearing. View "Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible" on Justia Law

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The lengthy delay between Defendant’s arrest in this case and his eventual guilty plea violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Defendant was charged in an indictment with murder in the second degree and other crimes. The time between Defendant’s arrest and his eventual guilty plea spanned six years, three months, and twenty-five days. Defendant spent the entirety of that period incarcerated. On appeal, the Appellate Division held that Defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated. The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division and dismissed the indictment, holding that, after evaluating all the relevant factors set forth in People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442 (1975), under the circumstances of this case, Defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. View "People v. Wiggins" on Justia Law

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Citizens United filed suit challenging the regulations promulgated by the Attorney General's office that required non-profit organizations to disclose their donors on a yearly basis. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of all claims, except the due process claim, for failure to state a claim. The court found that the mere requirement on a tax‐exempt organization to disclose its donor list to a state's authority charged with regulating non‐profits did not impermissibly chill speech or assembly rights. Furthermore, it did not operate as a prior restraint on non‐profits' solicitation of donations. Finally, the court reversed the dismissal of the due process claim for lack of ripeness and remanded so that the claim could be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a valid claim. View "Citizens United v. Schneiderman" on Justia Law

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In this case, a sheriff’s termination of a deputy sheriff was not constrained by the procedural due process protections purportedly afforded to the deputy sheriff under a now-outdated version of Ky. Rev. Stat. 15.520. Plaintiff, the deputy sheriff, sued the sheriff, alleging that the sheriff violated the due process procedures set forth in section 15.520, otherwise known as the Police Officers’ Bill of Rights. The trial court granted summary judgment for the sheriff. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that section 15.520 mandates that a sheriff who, like the sheriff in this case, elects to receive Kentucky Law Enforcement Foundation Program funding is bound by the due process procedures of that statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 15.520 was not meant to provide due process rights to sheriffs’ deputies. View "Elliott v. Lanham" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from her vehicle during a traffic stop was proper. In her suppression motion, Defendant argued that the traffic stop of her vehicle was not justified because she was not required to have her license plate illuminated when Sergeant James Jenkins pulled her over. The Commonwealth acknowledged that a license plate violation may not have been a proper basis for the stop but that Detective Wade Shoemaker had reasonable suspicion of Defendant’s participation in controlled drug buys, and Det. Shoemaker’s reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant’s vehicle transferred to Sgt. Jenkins so as to justify the traffic stop. The trial court concluded that no traffic violation occurred but that law enforcement had reasonable suspicion to pull over Defendant’s vehicle. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that because Sgt. Jenkins did not actually rely on Det. Shoemaker’s information and instead made the stop based solely on the license plate violation, the collective knowledge doctrine was irrelevant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the record reflected that the real reason Sgt. Jenkins pulled over Defendant’s vehicle was upon Det. Shoemaker’s request, and because Det. Shoemaker had reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop, suppression of the evidence was not required. View "Commonwealth v. Blake" on Justia Law