Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court denying Petitioner's petition for relief and resentencing under the new procedure set forth in Senate Bill No. 1437 (former Cal. Penal Code 1170.95, subd. (a); now Cal. Penal Code 1172.6, subd. (a)), holding that the trial court erred.Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Twelve years later, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill 1437 narrowing or eliminating certain forms of accomplice liability for murder. Petitioner petitioned for relief and resentencing under the new procedure, but the trial court denied the petition for failure to state a prima facie case. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court erred in rejecting Petitioner's prima facie showing and should have proceeded to an evidence hearing on Petitioner's resentencing petition. View "People v. Curiel" on Justia Law

In 1882-1883, the Railway acquired property and constructed the now-abandoned railroad line. In 2008, the Railway filed a notice of exemption from formal abandonment proceedings with the Surface Transportation Board (STB). The Illinois Department of Natural Resources showed interest in railbanking and interim trail use under the 1983 National Trails System Act Amendments, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d). The STB issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU). The owners of property adjoining the railroad line sued, alleging takings by operation of the Trails Act with respect to 51 parcels; 22 parcels were conveyed by instruments including the words “right of way” (ROW Agreements); three were conveyed by instruments including the words “for railroad purposes” (Purpose Agreements); and three are those for which no instruments were produced.The Claims Court granted the government summary judgment, finding that the Railway held the ROW Agreement and Purpose Agreement parcels in fee simple and that the owners failed to show that they had cognizable property interests in the non-instrument parcels. The Federal Circuit reversed. The court rejected the government’s argument that using the term “right of way” in the ROW Agreements referred to the land conveyed, not a limitation on the interest conveyed. For the Purpose Agreements, the Claims Court mistakenly relied on cases discussing deeds that did not include an expression of purpose in the granting clause. Illinois law indicates that the Railway obtained, at most, an easement over the non-instrument parcels. View "Barlow v. United States" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the suit brought by Plaintiff seeking to enjoin the New Hampshire Secretary of State from "accepting or processing" the "ballot access documentation" brought by Donald Trump, the former President of the United States, for the 2024 Republican presidential primary in the state of New Hampshire, holding that Plaintiff lacked standing.Plaintiff, a United States citizen and Republican primary presidential candidate, brought this complaint alleging that section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment barred Tump from "holding" the office of President of the United States again on the ground that he "engaged in insurrection or rebellion against [the U.S. Constitution], or [gave] aid or comfort to the enemies thereof." The district court dismissed the lawsuit on jurisdictional grounds, concluding that Plaintiff lacked standing under U.S. Const. art. III, 2 and that his section 3 claim presented a nonjusticiable political question. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to show that he could satisfy the "injury-in-fact" component of Article III standing. View "Castro v. Scanlan" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court ruling that the underlying suit was time barred as to all defendants in this action brought by Plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on behalf of her late son's estate on the six-year anniversary of his death, holding that the lawsuit was time barred.Plaintiff sued jail staff and a medical contractor (collectively, Defendants), alleging that while her son was detained in the Somerset County Jail, Defendants failed to recognize his serious mental illness, thus leading to his death following a suicide attempt. Defendants moved to dismiss the suit as time barred. The district court granted the motion. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on her allegations of error. View "Martin v. Somerset County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights when he was arrested as a terrorist for a post on Facebook. The district court granted Detective Randall Iles and Sheriff Mark Wood’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds and dismissed Bailey’s claims with prejudice.The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court held that the district court erred in concluding that Plaintiff’s Facebook was constitutionally unprotected; erred in granting qualified immunity to Defendant on Plaintiff’s Fourth and First Amendment claims; and erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff’s state law false arrest claim. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that Plaintiff has shown that Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity as to the First Amendment claim. Based on decades of Supreme Court precedent, it was clearly established that Plaintiff’s Facebook post did not fit within one of the narrow categories of unprotected speech, like incitement or true threats. Thus, when Defendant arrested Plaintiff he violated Plaintiff’s clearly established First Amendment right to engage in speech even when some listeners consider the speech offensive, upsetting, immature, in poor taste, or even dangerous. View "Bailey v. Iles" on Justia Law

Trammel was sentenced to 12 years in prison: the upper term of eight years for kidnapping, a consecutive 16 months for burglary, a consecutive eight months for making criminal threats, and a consecutive two years for a June 2017 domestic violence conviction (one year for the conviction plus a year on an attached arming enhancement). The court imposed concurrent three-year terms for two remaining domestic violence convictions and concurrent time-served sentences for misdemeanors.The court of appeal concluded that the court erred by imposing separate punishment for both domestic violence and simple assault, based on the same incident. The trial court conducted a full resentencing, noting that new sentencing laws (effective January 2022) applied. The court reviewed a mitigation assessment and resentenced Trammel to 12 years and four months–eight years for kidnapping; a consecutive 16 months for burglary; a consecutive two years for a 2017 domestic violence conviction–one year for the conviction plus a year on the attached arming enhancement; and consecutive one-year terms on the remaining domestic violence counts. The court stayed the punishment for criminal threats and misdemeanors. The court found that the lower term or middle term would be inappropriate because Trammel showed no remorse.The court of appeal again remanded. The imposition of a longer sentence on remand violates the California Constitution’s prohibition against double jeopardy. The court rejected Trammel’s request for another full resentencing hearing before a different judge, finding no showing of vindictiveness. View "People v. Trammel" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the appellate division affirming Defendant's conviction on two counts of murder in the second degree and one count of robbery in the second degree, holding that the warrantless entry into Defendant's home was not based on consent, and therefore, the suppression court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.Defendant was indicted on several charges including kidnapping, robbery, and felony murder. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the warrantless, nonconsensual entry into his home was unlawful. The suppression court denied the motion. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the warrantless entry into the apartment in which Defendant was found by police officers and arrested violated Defendant's rights under the New York and United States Constitutions. View "People v. Cuencas" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the appellate division affirming Defendant's conviction, holding Supreme Court should have suppressed a gun as the product of an impermissible stop because the police officers lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or probable cause that Defendant had violated the rules of the road while riding his bicycle.Defendant was riding his bicycle down a road when police officers drove alongside him and asked him to stop. Defendant stopped and, in response to an officer's question, admitted that he was carrying a gun. Defendant pleaded guilty to a weapons charge. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) police interference with a bicyclist is a seizure requiring reasonable suspicion of a criminal offense or probable cause of a Vehicle and Traffic Law violation; and (2) the officers in this case violated the New York and United States Constitutions when they stopped Defendant, and therefore, the indictment against Defendant must be dismissed. View "People v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant's conviction for one count of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, holding that the record did not support the trial court's conclusion that Defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966), when he was handcuffed and questioned by law enforcement officers.On appeal, Defendant argued that Supreme Court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to police while handcuffed and the physical evidence found in his vehicle because the officers failed to read him his Miranda rights prior to questioning him and because he never voluntarily consented to a search of the vehicle. The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant's conviction, holding (1) Defendant was in custody and had not received Miranda warnings when he answered questions by the police officers and therefore, Supreme Court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress his responses to the officers' questions; and (2) the Miranda violation when Defendant was stopped and handcuffed did not render his later written consent to search his vehicle involuntary. View "People v. Cabrera" on Justia Law

Officers Timothy Wright and Brett Willey responded to a domestic violence call where they shot and killed Robert Anderson. Anderson’s estate and family sued Wright, Willey, and the County of Lyon under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and Nevada law. Defendants moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted qualified immunity to the officers on the Section 1983 claims.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment excessive force claim because Plaintiffs’ rights were not clearly established. First, it was not obvious that defendants were constitutionally precluded from firing given that they were responding to an active domestic violence situation, lacked the benefit of having time to fully assess the circumstances, and needed to make split-second decisions as they were being charged. Second, Plaintiffs failed to show controlling authorities (or a consensus of persuasive ones) that would have put every reasonable officer on notice that defendants’ conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. Distinguishing this case from other cases, the panel noted that Anderson was in a narrow hall and rapidly approaching the officers, with no barrier between them. He could have accessed the officers’ weapons at any time or otherwise harmed them. Further, if the officers took the option to retreat to the house’s entryway, they would have left Jennifer Anderson—for whom they had just called an ambulance—alone with her husband or risked injury themselves if Anderson obtained a weapon from somewhere in his home. View "FREDRICK WAID, ET AL V. COUNTY OF LYON, ET AL" on Justia Law