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Wisconsin amended its state constitution to permit state‐funded transportation of private and parochial students. Under Wis. Stat. 121.54, if a school district operating within a metropolitan area where other public transportation is available to schoolchildren exercises the "city option," there must “be reasonable uniformity" regardless of whether students attend public or private schools. The Milwaukee district (MPS) has public city-wide schools, which offer special courses; attendance‐area schools, which draw only from a particular neighborhood; and nonattendance-area schools, which do not offer special classes but serve students from outside the area. MPS Policy provides free transportation for high schoolers only if they live two or more miles from their school and more than one mile from public transportation. Students who attend citywide or nonattendance‐area schools are governed by “Racial Balance, Modernization, Overload, and Lack of Facility” rules, making any student assigned to a school farther than two miles from her home eligible for free transportation, regardless of proximity to public transportation. Private schools must submit lists of students eligible to receive busing by May 15. There is no notification deadline for public schools. On May 14, St. Joan, a private school, submitted a 62-name list; on September 29, it added six names. MPS refused to bus any of the students because each lived within one mile of public transportation, and the later‐added students were disclosed after the deadline. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Rational bases exist for the differences in busing eligibility. MPS has legitimate interests in reducing overcapacity in crowded attendance‐area schools and in expanding special program access. MPS students who attend citywide or nonattendance‐area schools are more likely to have to travel farther than students who go to attendance‐area schools. The court remanded with respect to the deadline. View "St. Joan Antida High School Inc. v. Milwaukee Public School District" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss and motion to suppress, which Defendant filed before he was convicted of legal reentry after removal from the United States, holding that the district court did not err in not dismissing Defendant's indictment for delay in presentment or in not suppressing information that law enforcement had gathered about Defendant, including his identity. Defendant was a passenger in a van that was stopped for seatbelt violations. A Maine State Trooper who conducted the stop contacted an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officer for help identifying the passengers, several of whom did not appear to speak English. When he was asked for his identification, Defendant produced a consular ID card. ICE officers ran the card through ICE databases and determined that Defendant was suspected of illegal reentry. Defendant was subsequently convicted of illegally entering the United States after removal. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant made his initial appearance just as the criminal process was initiated, there was no unnecessary delay before his initial appearance and so no violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a); and (2) the district court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress. View "United States v. Garcia-Zavala" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction of conspiracy to deprive a person of civil rights and sentence of eighty-seven months in prison, holding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Defendant's conviction and that there was no other reversible error. Specifically, the Court held (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motions for judgment of acquittal based on the insufficiency of the evidence; (2) the district court properly admitted testimony of two government witnesses under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); (3) the district court did not violate Defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause; (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's second motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence; and (5) Defendant's sentence was procedurally reasonable. View "United States v. Martinez-Mercado" on Justia Law

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In this excessive force action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court denying summary judgment in favor of Petitioners, correctional officers and the warden at Mount Olive Correction Center (MOCC), on grounds of qualified immunity, holding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment in this matter. Respondent, an inmate at MOCC, brought this action asserting violations of his federal constitutional rights. The circuit court concluded that Petitioners were not entitled to summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact existed concerning the excessive force, deliberate indifference, and supervisory liability claims brought against them. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) given the genuine issues of material fact in this matter, Petitioners were not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity; and (2) the circuit court's order sufficiently addressed the parties' disparate factual allegations and the legal standards upon which the court's decision was based. View "McCourt v. Delgado" on Justia Law

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After the district court found that the boundaries for Mississippi State Senate District 22 dilute African-American voting strength and prevented those citizens from having the equal opportunity "to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice" that the Voting Rights Act guarantees, the district court switched 28 precincts between District 22 and a bordering district to remedy the violation. The Governor and Secretary of State sought a stay of the district court's final judgment. The Fourth Circuit granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion for a stay. The court held that the rule of construction, the text of the three-judge statute, its lineage, and the caselaw applying it all favor the district court's view that three judges are not required for a claim raising only statutory challenges to state legislative redistricting. The court also held that defendants have not shown a high likelihood of overturning the finding of vote dilution because their legal argument was at odds with "unimpeachable authority" from this court and their factual challenges must overcome deferential standards of review. The court rejected defendants' laches claim. However, the court held that the legislature should have the initial opportunity to draw new lines for District 22 that comply with the Voting Rights Act. Accordingly, the court issued an order granting a temporary stay to allow the legislature to remedy the Section 2 violation. Finally, the court held that defendants have not demonstrated a high likelihood of showing that the district court's narrow redraw was an abuse of discretion, and there was no risk of voter confusion and no outcry from state officials that implementing the district court’s remedy substantially disturbed its election process. View "Thomas v. Bryant" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against several parties, alleging violations of her parental rights over one of her minor children, E.J.K., under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. E.J.K. obtained a letter from Mid-Minnesota Legal Aid concluding that E.J.K. was legally emancipated under Minnesota law. Although the letter had no legal effect, E.J.K. was able to obtain funding for medical services and other living expenses, as well as gender transition care. The Eighth Circuit held that the district court properly granted judgment on the pleadings for St. Louis County (including the official-capacity claim against the interim director) because plaintiff did not adequately plead a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. In this case, plaintiff's conclusory assertion that the County acted based on a policy or custom was insufficient to state a claim. The court also held that plaintiff failed to state a claim for damages against the then-interim director of Public Health and Human Services; neither of the medical provider defendants were acting under state law; the school district's alleged handling of plaintiff's case, assuming it interfered with plaintiff's rights, was insufficient to establish a custom or practice under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); the school principal was entitled to qualified immunity; and declaratory and injunctive relief claims were moot. View "Calgaro v. St. Louis County" on Justia Law

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After plaintiff was fired from her tenured professorship by the Board of LSU, she filed suit against defendants alleging that they violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment right to free speech and academic freedom, and her Fourteenth Amendment procedural and substantive due process rights. Plaintiff also alleged a facial challenge to LSU's sexual harassment policies. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's as-applied challenge and held that the district court correctly concluded that plaintiff's speech was not protected by the First Amendment. In this case, plaintiff's speech was not a matter of public concern, because the use of profanity and discussion of professors' and students' sex lives were clearly not related to the training of Pre-K–Third grade teachers. The court vacated plaintiff's facial challenge and held that she failed to sue the proper party, the Board of Supervisors, which is responsible for the creation and enforcement of the policies at issue. Although the court need not address the district court's holding on qualified immunity because plaintiff's claims failed, the court nevertheless affirmed that all defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on her damages claims. View "Buchanan v. Alexander" on Justia Law

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Webb was charged with misdemeanor unlawful use of weapons (UUW) statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4)) after he was discovered carrying a stun gun in his jacket pocket while in his vehicle on a public street. Greco was charged under the same section after he was found carrying a stun gun in his backpack in a forest preserve, a public place. No concealed carry permit is available for stun guns. Both defendants moved to dismiss, arguing section 24-1(a)(4) operated as a complete ban on the carriage of stun guns and tasers in public and was, therefore, unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. The circuit court and Illinois Supreme Court agreed with defendants. Stun guns and tasers are bearable arms under the Second Amendment and may not be subjected to a categorical ban. Section 24-1(a)(4) constitutes a categorical ban. View "People v. Webb" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's request to challenge the reliability of his victim's testimony by cross-examining the victim at Defendant's resentencing hearing, holding that the district court did not violate Defendant's procedural due process rights by disallowing cross-examination of the victim at Defendant's resentencing. Defendant pleaded guilty to kidnapping for ransom. The First Circuit remanded the case for resentencing. On remand, the district court judge sentenced Defendant to eight months less than his previous sentence. On appeal, Defendant argued that his procedural due process rights were violated when the judge denied him the opportunity to contest misinformation about his treatment of the victim during the abduction by cross-examining the victim, which led to the imposition of a sentence based on inaccurate information. The First Circuit disagreed and affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's request to cross-examine the victim at Defendant's resentencing hearing. View "United States v. Berrios-Miranda" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed the district court's partial entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff's age discrimination claim and his family's derivative tort claims and the denial of Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, holding that the district court's summary judgment rulings were proper. Plaintiff and five of his family member brought this action under Puerto Rico law against Plaintiff's former employer and its insurance carrier alleging unjust dismissal and age discrimination in employment, his family asserting derivative tort claims arising from the alleged age discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on all but the unjust dismissal claim and denied Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, under the facts of this case, summary judgment was properly granted. View "Ramos-Santiago v. WHM Carib LLC" on Justia Law