Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

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Federal prisoner Sargeant filed a grievance against a prison official, Cruze, after she commented on his sexual preferences and refused to give him books that he had ordered. When Sargeant's case manager, Barfield, showed Sargeant the prison’s response, Sargeant noticed that it was signed by Cruze and pointed out that, under the prison’s rules, Cruze should not have seen a grievance lodged against her. Barfield then told others about the grievance. Sargeant filed a separate grievance against Barfield. In retaliation, Barfield “repeatedly” put Sargeant, who had cooperated with the government, in cells with prisoners known to be violent. This led to fights until Sargeant was transferred to another prison.Sargeant sued seeking monetary damages, alleging that Barfield retaliated against him for filing grievances. He did not identify which of his constitutional rights she had allegedly violated. In screening under 28 U.S.C. 1915A, the judge decided that Sargeant could proceed only on a First Amendment retaliation claim and did not discuss any possible Eighth Amendment claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Under the Bivens doctrine, a federal prisoner cannot recover damages for a violation of First Amendment rights. Recognizing a failure-to-protect claim in this context would risk intrusion with the federal prison system; the claim presents separation-of-powers concerns and special factors not accounted for by any of the Supreme Court’s Bivens precedents. View "Sargeant v. Barfield" on Justia Law

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After the district court denied Petitioner’s initial 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 petition, he obtained new counsel and filed a motion to reopen that judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). He argued that exceptional circumstances warranted this relief because his original Section 2254 counsel had, in effect, abandoned him by submitting a Section 2254 petition that omitted several potentially meritorious issues and inadequately presented the issues that had been raised. He asked the court to reopen the judgment and allow him to file additional briefings and new claims. The district court concluded that Petitioner’s motion was not a true Rule 60(b) motion. Rather, Petitioner was attempting to use Rule 60(b) to circumvent the statutory limits placed on second or successive Section 2254 petitions. Recognizing that it would lack jurisdiction to consider a second Section 2254 petition, the district court denied Petitioner’s motion without considering its merits. Petitioner appealed.   The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion because he effectively sought to file a second or successive Section 2254 petition, something that a district court cannot authorize. The court also wrote that because it also concludes that the district court should have dismissed Petitioner’s motion rather than deny it, it vacated the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss. View "Steven Bixby v. Bryan Stirling" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court denying Petitioner's petition for relief and resentencing under the new procedure set forth in Senate Bill No. 1437 (former Cal. Penal Code 1170.95, subd. (a); now Cal. Penal Code 1172.6, subd. (a)), holding that the trial court erred.Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Twelve years later, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill 1437 narrowing or eliminating certain forms of accomplice liability for murder. Petitioner petitioned for relief and resentencing under the new procedure, but the trial court denied the petition for failure to state a prima facie case. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court erred in rejecting Petitioner's prima facie showing and should have proceeded to an evidence hearing on Petitioner's resentencing petition. View "People v. Curiel" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, who was formerly incarcerated at Downstate Correctional Facility, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the officers for violating his First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. Plaintiff named as defendants additional corrections officers. He alleged that the officers violated his First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion by preventing him from observing the Jewish holiday of Shavuot on two consecutive evenings. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers because (1) some named officers were not personally involved in the alleged violation on the first night of Shavuot, and (2) Plaintiff’s observance of the second night of the holiday was only shortened, not denied entirely, which did not rise to the level of a “substantial burden” on his religious beliefs.   The Second Circuit vacated in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the district court. The court wrote that the district court erred in holding that Plaintiff could not prevail on his claim because he did not make the threshold showing of a “substantial burden” on his religious beliefs. Such a showing is not required. Rather, because Plaintiff has shown a burden on his sincere religious beliefs, he has established a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. The court vacated the judgment insofar as the district court granted summary judgment because of a purported “substantial burden” requirement, and affirmed the judgment insofar as the district court granted summary judgment to those officers for whom there was no evidence of personal involvement. View "Kravitz v. Purcell" on Justia Law

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In 1882-1883, the Railway acquired property and constructed the now-abandoned railroad line. In 2008, the Railway filed a notice of exemption from formal abandonment proceedings with the Surface Transportation Board (STB). The Illinois Department of Natural Resources showed interest in railbanking and interim trail use under the 1983 National Trails System Act Amendments, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d). The STB issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use (NITU). The owners of property adjoining the railroad line sued, alleging takings by operation of the Trails Act with respect to 51 parcels; 22 parcels were conveyed by instruments including the words “right of way” (ROW Agreements); three were conveyed by instruments including the words “for railroad purposes” (Purpose Agreements); and three are those for which no instruments were produced.The Claims Court granted the government summary judgment, finding that the Railway held the ROW Agreement and Purpose Agreement parcels in fee simple and that the owners failed to show that they had cognizable property interests in the non-instrument parcels. The Federal Circuit reversed. The court rejected the government’s argument that using the term “right of way” in the ROW Agreements referred to the land conveyed, not a limitation on the interest conveyed. For the Purpose Agreements, the Claims Court mistakenly relied on cases discussing deeds that did not include an expression of purpose in the granting clause. Illinois law indicates that the Railway obtained, at most, an easement over the non-instrument parcels. View "Barlow v. United States" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the suit brought by Plaintiff seeking to enjoin the New Hampshire Secretary of State from "accepting or processing" the "ballot access documentation" brought by Donald Trump, the former President of the United States, for the 2024 Republican presidential primary in the state of New Hampshire, holding that Plaintiff lacked standing.Plaintiff, a United States citizen and Republican primary presidential candidate, brought this complaint alleging that section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment barred Tump from "holding" the office of President of the United States again on the ground that he "engaged in insurrection or rebellion against [the U.S. Constitution], or [gave] aid or comfort to the enemies thereof." The district court dismissed the lawsuit on jurisdictional grounds, concluding that Plaintiff lacked standing under U.S. Const. art. III, 2 and that his section 3 claim presented a nonjusticiable political question. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to show that he could satisfy the "injury-in-fact" component of Article III standing. View "Castro v. Scanlan" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court ruling that the underlying suit was time barred as to all defendants in this action brought by Plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on behalf of her late son's estate on the six-year anniversary of his death, holding that the lawsuit was time barred.Plaintiff sued jail staff and a medical contractor (collectively, Defendants), alleging that while her son was detained in the Somerset County Jail, Defendants failed to recognize his serious mental illness, thus leading to his death following a suicide attempt. Defendants moved to dismiss the suit as time barred. The district court granted the motion. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on her allegations of error. View "Martin v. Somerset County" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights when he was arrested as a terrorist for a post on Facebook. The district court granted Detective Randall Iles and Sheriff Mark Wood’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds and dismissed Bailey’s claims with prejudice.The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court held that the district court erred in concluding that Plaintiff’s Facebook was constitutionally unprotected; erred in granting qualified immunity to Defendant on Plaintiff’s Fourth and First Amendment claims; and erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff’s state law false arrest claim. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that Plaintiff has shown that Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity as to the First Amendment claim. Based on decades of Supreme Court precedent, it was clearly established that Plaintiff’s Facebook post did not fit within one of the narrow categories of unprotected speech, like incitement or true threats. Thus, when Defendant arrested Plaintiff he violated Plaintiff’s clearly established First Amendment right to engage in speech even when some listeners consider the speech offensive, upsetting, immature, in poor taste, or even dangerous. View "Bailey v. Iles" on Justia Law

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Trammel was sentenced to 12 years in prison: the upper term of eight years for kidnapping, a consecutive 16 months for burglary, a consecutive eight months for making criminal threats, and a consecutive two years for a June 2017 domestic violence conviction (one year for the conviction plus a year on an attached arming enhancement). The court imposed concurrent three-year terms for two remaining domestic violence convictions and concurrent time-served sentences for misdemeanors.The court of appeal concluded that the court erred by imposing separate punishment for both domestic violence and simple assault, based on the same incident. The trial court conducted a full resentencing, noting that new sentencing laws (effective January 2022) applied. The court reviewed a mitigation assessment and resentenced Trammel to 12 years and four months–eight years for kidnapping; a consecutive 16 months for burglary; a consecutive two years for a 2017 domestic violence conviction–one year for the conviction plus a year on the attached arming enhancement; and consecutive one-year terms on the remaining domestic violence counts. The court stayed the punishment for criminal threats and misdemeanors. The court found that the lower term or middle term would be inappropriate because Trammel showed no remorse.The court of appeal again remanded. The imposition of a longer sentence on remand violates the California Constitution’s prohibition against double jeopardy. The court rejected Trammel’s request for another full resentencing hearing before a different judge, finding no showing of vindictiveness. View "People v. Trammel" on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the appellate division affirming Defendant's conviction on two counts of murder in the second degree and one count of robbery in the second degree, holding that the warrantless entry into Defendant's home was not based on consent, and therefore, the suppression court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.Defendant was indicted on several charges including kidnapping, robbery, and felony murder. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the warrantless, nonconsensual entry into his home was unlawful. The suppression court denied the motion. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the warrantless entry into the apartment in which Defendant was found by police officers and arrested violated Defendant's rights under the New York and United States Constitutions. View "People v. Cuencas" on Justia Law