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Hudson was shot and killed; the gun was not recovered. Riley was charged with first-degree murder and being an armed habitual criminal. The judge severed the armed habitual criminal count and proceeded with the murder trial. In finding Riley not guilty of murder, the jury found that the prosecution had not proven “that during the commission of the offense of first-degree murder the defendant personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused death.” Three of the same witnesses testified at the armed habitual criminal trial before the same judge. The parties stipulated that Riley had two qualifying prior convictions, leaving the judge to decide only whether Riley possessed a gun. Defense counsel pointed out the inconsistencies in the stories of the state’s witnesses and noted that none of them could describe the gun allegedly possessed by Riley, despite identifying him as the shooter. The judge found Riley guilty. On direct appeal, the court ruled that the state was not collaterally estopped from prosecuting Riley as an armed habitual criminal because whether he had possessed a gun was not decided at his murder trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief. did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law in rejecting his collateral estoppel claim. View "Riley v. Calloway" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief for petitioner, who was criminally convicted in both state and federal court. Petitioner argued that his federal sentence actually commenced on one of the instances when the state prematurely transferred him to the federal authorities, and thus he should receive credit against his federal sentence for the period starting on the date he was erroneously turned over to federal authorities and including all his time in state prison after he was returned to state custody. The panel explained that because the state credited the time the federal authorities erroneously held petitioner against his state sentence, he effectively sought double-credit against both his state and federal sentences for the period between August 2009 and June 2011. The panel held that because these erroneous transfers did not manifest the state's consent to terminate its primary jurisdiction over petitioner, he was not in federal custody for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 3585(a), and therefore the federal sentence did not commence. View "Johnson v. Gill" on Justia Law

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At issue was at which point in time Defendant was considered “in custody” for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The circuit court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress incriminating statements made to law enforcement officers, concluding that Defendant was not in custody at the time the statements were made. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in light of the totality of the circumstances of this case, Defendant’s confession did not transform his status to that of “in custody.” Rather, Defendant was not in custody until detectives took his cell phone, approximately ten minutes after his confession, and instructed him to remain in the interview room. Because Defendant was not in custody until this point, which was after his alleged request for counsel, his Fifth Amendment right to counsel did not attach. View "State v. Bartelt" on Justia Law

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Labor Code section 244, which does not require a litigant to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a civil action, applies only to claims before the Labor Commissioner. The Court of Appeal explained that section 244 has no effect on Campbell v. Regents of University of California, (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, which held that public employees must pursue appropriate internal administrative remedies before filing a civil action against their employer. In this case, plaintiff appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, the County, in a wrongful termination action. The court held that plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies on her claims that the County terminated her job to discriminate against her; there were no triable issues of fact on plaintiff's claim that she was terminated because of her sexual orientation; and the trial court erred by awarding the County costs on the Fair Employment and Housing Act cause of action. View "Terris v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

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Labor Code section 244, which does not require a litigant to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a civil action, applies only to claims before the Labor Commissioner. The Court of Appeal explained that section 244 has no effect on Campbell v. Regents of University of California, (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, which held that public employees must pursue appropriate internal administrative remedies before filing a civil action against their employer. In this case, plaintiff appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, the County, in a wrongful termination action. The court held that plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies on her claims that the County terminated her job to discriminate against her; there were no triable issues of fact on plaintiff's claim that she was terminated because of her sexual orientation; and the trial court erred by awarding the County costs on the Fair Employment and Housing Act cause of action. View "Terris v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

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The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint that alleged claims related to his termination from the police department. The court held that plaintiff's retaliation claim, on its face, was outside the bounds of the Title VII statute; nothing in plaintiff's complaint or his deposition testimony indicated that he was pursuing a Title VII claim encompassing race-based discrimination and thus he could not submit a claim via an affidavit at the summary judgment stage; and the district court correctly dismissed plaintiff's contract claim where the strain of public policy that plaintiff sought to invoke was simply inapposite to the facts in this case. View "Winfrey v. Forrest City, Arkansas" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of battery and other offenses, holding that the trial court committed structural error in handling Defendant’s invocation of his right to self-representation. At a motions hearing before Defendant’s trial was to begin, Defendant interjected during argument before the court and stated that he wanted it on the record that he was “unequivocally” asserting his right to self-representation. The judge refused to take up the matter of self-representation, telling Defendant that he must file a written motion if he wanted to represent himself. Defendant did not file the motion or otherwise reassert the right to self-representation when court reconvened. The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentence, rejecting Defendant’s claim that he was denied his right to self-representation. The Supreme Court concluded that Defendant was denied his right to self-representation and that the error was structural. The court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "State v. Bunyard" on Justia Law

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After Defendant’s initial sentence was voided for illegality, the district court resentenced Defendant to a new term of imprisonment. The district court originally suspended Defendant’s prison sentence and instead ordered a five-year term of probation. Upon resentencing, the court refused to credit the time Defendant spent on probation pursuant to the initial sentence against the new term of imprisonment. The Supreme Court held that the failure to award credit for the time spent on probation violated Defendant’s constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment. The court held that all time Defendant spent on probation pursuant to the voided sentence must be fully credited against a corrected sentence of incarceration because, when an initial sentence is voided for illegality, any punishments already endured must be credited against the corrected sentence. The dissent disagreed, arguing that probation should not be equated with punishment in the same way incarceration is considered for double jeopardy purposes. View "State v. Jepsen" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit amended an opinion affirming the district court's judgment denying a habeas corpus petition where petitioner sought a custody redetermination as he awaited the outcome of administrative proceedings to determine whether he has a reasonable fear of returning to his native country of El Salvador. The panel held that reinstated removal orders were administratively final for detention purposes, and that the detention of aliens subject to reinstated removal orders was governed by 8 U.S.C. 1231(a), rather than section 1226(a). Therefore, petitioner was not entitled to a bond hearing. View "Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible" on Justia Law

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The lengthy delay between Defendant’s arrest in this case and his eventual guilty plea violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Defendant was charged in an indictment with murder in the second degree and other crimes. The time between Defendant’s arrest and his eventual guilty plea spanned six years, three months, and twenty-five days. Defendant spent the entirety of that period incarcerated. On appeal, the Appellate Division held that Defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated. The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division and dismissed the indictment, holding that, after evaluating all the relevant factors set forth in People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442 (1975), under the circumstances of this case, Defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. View "People v. Wiggins" on Justia Law