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The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's final judgment in an action alleging that an IRS test for determining certain liabilities was facially unconstitutional. The court held that Freedom Path did not have standing to bring this facial challenge and therefore the court dismissed the action based on lack of jurisdiction. In this case, plaintiff's claimed chilled speech injury was not fairly traceable to the text of Revenue Ruling 2004-6. View "Freedom Path, Inc. v. IRS" on Justia Law

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Rainsberger was charged with murdering his elderly mother and was held for two months. He claims that the detective who built the case against him, Benner, submitted a probable cause affidavit that contained lies and omitted exculpatory evidence. When the prosecutor dismissed the case because of evidentiary problems, Rainsberger sued Benner under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied Benner’s motion, in which he argued qualified immunity. Benner conceded, for purposes of his appeal, that he knowingly or recklessly made false statements in the probable cause affidavit, arguing that knowingly or recklessly misleading the magistrate in a probable cause affidavit only violates the Fourth Amendment if the omissions and lies were material to probable cause. The Seventh Circuit rejected that argument. Materiality depends on whether the affidavit demonstrates probable cause when the lies are taken out and the exculpatory evidence is added in. When that is done in this case, Benner’s affidavit fails to establish probable cause to believe that Rainsberger murdered his mother. Because it is clearly established that it violates the Fourth Amendment “to use deliberately falsified allegations to demonstrate probable cause,” Benner is not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Rainsberger v. Benner" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part the district court’s dismissal of Appellant’s complaint claiming that he was fired from his job in retaliation for accusing his employer of violating the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) and making false representations in customer contracts, holding that Appellant plausibly pleaded that he engaged in protected conduct within the meaning of a False Claims Act (FCA) retaliation claim. The district court dismissed the complaint after finding that Appellant did not allege sufficient facts to show he was engaged in protected conduct within the meaning of the retaliation provision of the FCA. The First Circuit affirmed as to the contractual language claim but vacated and remanded as to the AKS claim, holding that Appellant plausibly pleaded that the concerns he raised about certain payments could have led to an FCA action. View "Guilfoile v. Shields" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court finding the board of regents of Harris-Stowe State University liable on Dr. Shereen Kader’s claims of national origin discrimination and retaliation under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), holding that the circuit court’s jury instructions were erroneous and prejudicial. The jury returned a verdict in Dr. Kader’s favor on her claims of national original discrimination and retaliation, awarding $750,000 in actual damages and $1.75 million in punitive damages. The circuit court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict. On appeal, Harris-Stowe argued that the circuit court’s disjunctive jury instructions Nos. 8 and 9 misled and confused the jury, thereby resulting in prejudice. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the circuit court’s jury instructions were erroneous and prejudicial because they included at least one alternative that did not constitute actionable conduct under the MHRA. View "Kader v. Board of Regents of Harris-Stowe State University" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacating the district court’s dismissal of Defendant’s excessive speeding citation and remanded this case for further proceedings, holding that double jeopardy is inapplicable to the civil offense of speeding under its current statutory framework and that Defendant was subject to prosecution for both excessive speeding and speeding. Defendant was concurrently cited for speeding and excessive speeding offenses while driving through two separate speed zones. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the excessive speeding charge, concluding that the “lesser included offense” provision of Haw. Rev. Stat. 701-109(1)(a) and the double jeopardy clause barred the State from prosecuting Defendant on the excessive speeding charge. The ICA vacated the district court’s order granting the motion to dismiss, holding that the entry of judgment on Defendant’s noncriminal speeding infraction failed to bar the State from prosecuting him for the crime of excessive speeding. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded, holding that if the district court finds at trial that the excessive speeding charge arises from the same conduct as the speeding infraction, section 701-109(1)(a) will preclude Defendant’s conviction for excessive speeding. View "State v. Kalua" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit denied as unnecessary petitioner's application to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition. Petitioner argued that his petition was not second or successive, but rather a first petition challenging a new judgment that added credit for the time he served before sentencing. The panel held that Gonzalez v. Sherman, 873 F.3d 763, 769 (9th Cir. 2017), which held that, under California law, a state court's amended judgment awarding a defendant credit for time served constituted a new judgment, applied to Nevada law. Therefore, petitioner's habeas petition was the first petition challenging his amended judgment. View "Turner v. Baker" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's action alleging that Domino's Pizza's website and mobile application were not fully accessible to a blind or visually impaired person, in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and California's Unruh Civil Rights Act. The panel held that the ADA applied to Domino's website and app, a place of public accommodation, which connected customers to the goods and services of Domino's physical restaurants. The panel also held that imposing liability on Domino's under the ADA would not violate the company's Fourth Amendment right to due process where the statute was not impermissibly vague, Domino's had received fair notice of compliance, and plaintiff did not seek to impose liability on Domino's for failure to comply with the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 2.0, private industry standards for website accessibility. Furthermore, the lack of specific regulations did not eliminate Domino's statutory duty. Finally, the panel held that the district court erred by applying the prudential doctrine of primary jurisdiction and the district court's ruling unduly delayed the resolution of an issue that could be decided by the court. View "Robles v. Domino's Pizza, LLC" on Justia Law

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Representatives of the estates of black male farmers sought to submit claims of past discrimination in agricultural credit programs to a claims-processing framework set up to resolve Hispanic and female farmers' credit discrimination claims. The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action, holding that representatives lacked standing to challenge the framework because they have no live underlying credit discrimination claims to present. In this case, representatives never submitted claims in the Black Farmers remedial process, but instead sought to present their claims in the parallel framework for claims of discrimination against women and/or Hispanic farmers. Therefore, the harm representatives asserted from being excluded was not redressable. Furthermore, representatives' claims were time barred and, even if the claims were not time barred, any credit discrimination claim a member of the Black Farmers plaintiff class may have had during the relevant period, whether or not actually pursued in the remedial process established under the Black Farmers' consent decree, was now precluded by that decree, or, for any member who opted out, time barred. View "Estate of Earnest Lee Boyland v. United States Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for unlawful possession of drugs found within a locked glove compartment, holding that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress and that Defendant was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. In denying Defendant’s motion to suppress the motion judge found that the police had probable cause to arrest Defendant for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of marijuana and that the search of the vehicle was justified as an inventory search. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge was warranted in finding that police had probable cause to believe that Defendant had operated a motor vehicle while impaired; and (2) while the motion judge’s decision to deny the motion to suppress was improper on the grounds that the police conducted a lawful inventory search, the officers had authority to search the vehicle, pursuant to the automobile exception, for evidence pertaining to the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence. View "Commonwealth v. Davis" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against Chief Justice Valdez in his individual and official capacities, arguing that Valdez intervened in plaintiff's hiring as retaliation for plaintiff filing a complaint against Valdez. The Fifth Circuit held that Valdez is entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established as of May 2014 that where a briefing attorney swore as part of his employment to comply with a code of conduct requiring him to report judicial misconduct to a specific state authority, he nonetheless spoke as a citizen in reporting a judge to that authority. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order denying Valdez's motion for summary judgment in both his official and individual capacity. View "Anderson v. Valdez" on Justia Law