Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The appellant was convicted in the 1990s for bank and armored car robberies committed with a group that included Anthony Shea. These crimes involved frequent use of firearms, and in one particularly violent incident, two armored car guards were killed execution-style. The convictions included armed bank robbery, carjacking, Hobbs Act robbery and conspiracy, gun possession by a felon or drug user, and aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The trial judge instructed the jury that several offenses were “crimes of violence” for the gun-use charge, but the verdict form did not specify which predicate offense the jury relied upon.Following his conviction, the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire sentenced him to life imprisonment, applying enhancements under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on prior convictions. After the Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States struck down ACCA’s residual clause, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit allowed the appellant to file a successive habeas petition. The district court subsequently vacated the ACCA-enhanced sentence and imposed a lower term, but declined to grant a full resentencing or to vacate the § 924(c) conviction, reasoning that the jury instruction error was harmless because valid predicate offenses remained.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the denial of § 2255 relief de novo and for harmless error. It held that the district court's reliance on the harmless-error standard was correct and that the error in instructing on an invalid predicate offense did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict, given the interrelated and coextensive nature of the valid and invalid predicates. The court further held that the appellant was not entitled to a certificate of appealability or to a full resentencing, as no substantial constitutional claim was raised regarding the district court’s choice of remedy. The judgment was affirmed and the request for a certificate of appealability denied. View "McDonald v. US" on Justia Law

A group of Guatemalan nationals were recruited under the H-2A visa program by a Michigan agricultural company and its owners to work seasonal jobs between 2017 and 2019. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants illegally charged recruitment fees, underpaid wages, forced them to live in poor conditions, confiscated personal documents, limited their freedom, and threatened them with deportation if they complained. The plaintiffs claimed these actions violated federal anti-trafficking laws, the Fair Labor Standards Act, Michigan labor and trafficking statutes, and state contract law.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, the case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found in favor of the plaintiffs on most claims, awarding both compensatory and punitive damages, while denying certain claims against one defendant and rejecting the defendants’ counterclaims. The district court denied the defendants’ motions for mistrial, to dismiss for forum non conveniens, for a new trial, and for remittitur of punitive damages. The court entered judgment for the plaintiffs, including damages, attorney fees, and costs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the punitive damages awarded were not grossly excessive or arbitrary and thus did not violate due process, applying the guideposts from BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s evidentiary rulings, denial of a mistrial, or in allowing the case to proceed in Michigan rather than Guatemala. The court further concluded that alleged statute of limitations defenses were either inapplicable or waived. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "Gomez-Echeverria v. Purpose Point Harvesting, LLC" on Justia Law

A woman was arrested and searched by Colorado Springs police officers in the parking lot of a motel where she lived, following her involvement in assisting an overdose victim and recording the police response. The officers claimed she was disruptive and failed to comply with commands to leave the scene, while she maintained she was cooperative and was wrongfully arrested. After her acquittal of the municipal charge, she brought a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the officers for unlawful arrest and search, seeking damages including for emotional distress.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado addressed extensive disputes during discovery. The plaintiff had deleted social media videos of her later police encounters, as well as records and messages related to the arrest. The court sanctioned her and her attorneys with a monetary penalty and gave adverse-inference jury instructions, directing the jury to presume that she regularly disrupted police business and profited from posting such videos. At trial, over her objection, the court admitted more than twenty clips from her unrelated copwatching videos, which portrayed her berating officers and threatening lawsuits. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the officers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the unrelated videos and by issuing an adverse-inference instruction that invited improper propensity reasoning, thereby unfairly prejudicing the plaintiff before the jury and depriving her of a fair trial. The Tenth Circuit vacated the judgment for the officers and remanded the case for a new trial. However, it affirmed the monetary sanction against the plaintiff and her attorneys for discovery violations. View "Cronick v. City of Colorado Springs" on Justia Law

A fourteen-year-old student, JPZ, was suspended from school following an altercation. The school principal, Melissa Arendts, notified JPZ's mother and requested JPZ be picked up. Upon arrival, JPZ's grandmother found him isolated and awaiting questioning by Scott Labish, a sheriff’s deputy serving as a school resource officer. Labish, in uniform, questioned JPZ, allegedly in a threatening manner, and told him about a “Three Strike” policy that would result in criminal prosecution and expulsion after another infraction. JPZ became distressed, left school, and subsequently died by suicide at home several hours later. JPZ's father, Brian Zimmermann, as administrator of JPZ’s estate, sued Arendts, Labish, the school district, and Macomb County, alleging federal due process violations and state law claims.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed the wrongful death claim but allowed four other claims to proceed: deprivation of substantive due process, conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and Monell liability. Defendants moved to dismiss the remaining claims based on qualified and state governmental immunity and deficiencies in the Monell claim. The district court denied these motions in part, leading to an interlocutory appeal by the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial de novo. The Sixth Circuit held that the facts did not support a substantive due process claim under the state-created danger doctrine, as the defendants neither increased JPZ’s risk of harm from a third party nor acted with deliberate indifference. The conspiracy and Monell claims failed because no underlying constitutional violation was adequately alleged. The court also found the defendants entitled to state governmental immunity for the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, as the conduct alleged did not indicate malice. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the motions to dismiss and remanded the case. View "Zimmermann v. Labish" on Justia Law

In October 1978, a woman named Tana Woolley was found dead in her apartment in Rosamond, California. She had been strangled with a sock, and her body was partially undressed. Initial investigation yielded no arrests, although DNA and other forensic evidence were collected. Decades later, with advances in DNA technology, semen stains found on Woolley’s bedspread were tested and matched the defendant, who lived in the same apartment complex at the time. The defendant denied knowing Woolley or ever being in her apartment. Further investigation revealed he had previously committed multiple sexual assaults, and evidence of these prior offenses was admitted at trial.The case was first tried in the Kern County Superior Court. The jury convicted the defendant of first degree murder and found true two special circumstances: that the murder was committed during the commission or attempted commission of rape and burglary, both requiring a finding of willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder under the then-applicable 1977 death penalty law. At the penalty phase, the jury returned a verdict of death, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. The defense raised several issues, including challenges to jury selection, the admission of prior sexual offenses, and various constitutional and evidentiary claims.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case on automatic appeal. It addressed whether the defendant established a prima facie case of racial discrimination in jury selection, the admissibility and instructions regarding other sexual offenses, the sufficiency of the evidence for the murder and special circumstance findings, and challenges under the California Racial Justice Act. The court held that the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in jury selection, that the evidence and instructions regarding prior sexual offenses were properly admitted, and that sufficient evidence supported the convictions and special circumstance findings. It further determined that no prejudicial error occurred under the Racial Justice Act. The court affirmed the judgment of death. View "P. v. Hazlett" on Justia Law

Two activists participated in demonstrations outside the Israeli embassy in Washington, D.C., protesting Israel's military actions in Gaza. Over several months, three incidents occurred involving Rabbi Herzfeld, a local rabbi and community leader, and the activists. During these incidents, the activists alleged that Rabbi Herzfeld and his companions made provocative and upsetting remarks, engaged in intimidating behavior, and, in one instance, initiated a federal lawsuit and media coverage that the activists felt endangered them. The activists felt harassed and took steps to increase their personal security after these events.Following the third incident, the activists filed petitions for anti-stalking orders in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, alleging that Rabbi Herzfeld’s conduct constituted stalking under D.C. law. Rabbi Herzfeld moved to dismiss the petitions, arguing that his actions were protected by the First Amendment and did not meet the statutory definition of stalking, citing precedent from Mashaud v. Boone. The trial court held a summary trial and ultimately denied the petitions, finding that the conduct did not amount to threats or surveillance within the meaning of the statute and was constitutionally protected speech. Rabbi Herzfeld later sought attorney’s fees under the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act and, alternatively, for alleged bad faith.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It affirmed the denial of the anti-stalking petitions, holding that Rabbi Herzfeld’s conduct did not constitute “true threats” and was protected political speech, not actionable as stalking. The court vacated the award of attorney’s fees, finding the trial court had applied the wrong legal standard under the Anti-SLAPP Act and had not given proper notice for a bad-faith fee award. The matter was remanded for further proceedings regarding attorney’s fees. View "Rokhvand & Barmada v. Herzfeld" on Justia Law

During a traffic stop in Washington, D.C., police officers pulled over a BMW for equipment violations. Elliott Wallace was driving, Jowan Plummer was in the front passenger seat, and Antoine Layne was in the back. Officers observed suspicious movements by Plummer and Layne, leading them to search the vehicle and its occupants. Police found an open liquor bottle, a firearm under a seat, and various drugs and cash on both Wallace and Layne. Both were charged with multiple drug and firearm offenses.The case proceeded to trial in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. The government presented expert testimony from an MPD narcotics officer, who had general experience with narcotics and some recent exposure to N,N-dimethylpentylone (“boot”). Over defense objections, the court allowed this expert testimony. The jury convicted Wallace and Layne of the charged offenses. Wallace was found guilty of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and related charges; Layne was convicted of possession with intent to distribute N,N-dimethylpentylone while armed, as well as several firearm offenses.On appeal, Wallace and Layne argued that the trial court erred in admitting the government’s expert testimony regarding “boot,” that the evidence was insufficient to support Wallace’s conviction for possession with intent to distribute, and that the trial judge improperly questioned witnesses, affecting Layne’s right to an impartial trial. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed these claims. Applying the appropriate standards of review, the court held that the trial judge did not abuse discretion in admitting the expert testimony, that the judge’s witness questioning was neither improper nor prejudicial under plain-error review, and that there was sufficient evidence to support Wallace’s conviction. The court affirmed the convictions on all counts. View "Wallace & Layne v. United States" on Justia Law

Two plaintiffs, one individual and one advocacy organization, filed suit against a ridesharing company, alleging discrimination against persons with mobility-related disabilities. They claimed the company violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) by failing to make wheelchair accessible vehicles (WAVs)—that accommodate fixed-frame wheelchairs—available in all regions it operates, instead of only nine cities. The plaintiffs proposed several modifications to the company’s policies and practices to increase WAV availability in Westchester County, New York, and sought class certification for affected residents and visitors.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held a bench trial. After reviewing the evidence, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate either that the rideshare platform’s limited menu constituted a barrier to WAV access or that their proposed modifications would effectively or reasonably achieve WAV transportation in the relevant regions. The court also determined that the evidence did not show the proposed modifications were likely to be effective, and that the defendant’s proof established the modifications would not be reasonable. As a result, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings for clear error and considered plaintiffs’ arguments regarding evidentiary burdens and the effectiveness of proposed modifications. The Second Circuit concluded that plaintiffs bore the burden of persuasion as to effectiveness, and only a light burden of production as to reasonableness. The appellate court found no error in the district court’s application of these standards and affirmed the judgment, holding that the plaintiffs failed to show their proposed modifications would effectively provide WAV service in Westchester County. View "Lowell v. Lyft, Inc." on Justia Law

Several parents and a grandparent of two female high school athletes challenged actions taken by officials of a New Hampshire public school district. The dispute arose after the parents wore pink "XX" wristbands during a girls' soccer game as a passive protest against the participation of a transgender athlete, in light of recent litigation about transgender students’ eligibility for girls’ sports. School administrators, concerned about possible harassment and disruption, instructed the protestors to remove the wristbands and later issued sanctions, including no-trespass orders preventing them from attending future school events.The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire reviewed the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction. It analyzed the school’s actions under First Amendment principles applicable to limited public fora and determined that the administrators’ interpretation and enforcement of school policy did not constitute impermissible viewpoint discrimination. The district court denied the request for injunctive relief, concluding that the school’s interests justified its response to the protest.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit examined whether the school district’s actions amounted to viewpoint discrimination against the plaintiffs’ passive speech. The court found that the protest did not materially disrupt the event or amount to harassment, and that the sanctions appeared motivated by disagreement with the protest’s message. The First Circuit held that the plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on their viewpoint discrimination claim, specifically regarding the sanctions imposed at the soccer game’s sidelines and adjacent parking lot. The court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings to determine whether any interim relief, such as a declaratory judgment, is warranted. No costs were awarded. View "Fellers v. Kelley" on Justia Law

A city’s Chief of Police was recruited for his reformist reputation and soon after his arrival, he observed and reported that several City Commissioners were improperly interfering in police investigations and using police resources to pursue personal vendettas. The Chief communicated his concerns to the Mayor and City Manager, and, believing himself unable to investigate the Commissioners due to a prior City resolution, he sent a whistleblowing memorandum detailing abuses of power to the Mayor, City Manager, the State Attorney’s Office, and the FBI. The memo was subsequently leaked to the media. Following this, the Chief faced public criticism from the Commissioners, had his job responsibilities undermined, was suspended with pay by the City Manager pending a termination hearing, and was ultimately terminated by the City Commission.The Chief filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against three Commissioners and the City Manager, alleging retaliation for protected First Amendment activity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The individual defendants moved to dismiss, asserting legislative and qualified immunity. The district court denied their motions, finding that neither defense shielded the Commissioners or the City Manager at that stage.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of immunity de novo. The Eleventh Circuit held that the Commissioners were not entitled to legislative immunity because terminating an employee is administrative, not legislative, action. The court further held that the Commissioners were not entitled to qualified immunity at the pleading stage because, accepting the complaint’s allegations as true, the Chief’s whistleblower memo was constitutionally protected speech, and binding precedent clearly established that retaliating against such speech is unlawful. However, the court held that the City Manager was entitled to qualified immunity, as it was not clearly established that suspending the Chief with pay, pending further proceedings, constituted an adverse employment action. The panel affirmed the denial of immunity for the Commissioners, reversed as to the City Manager, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Acevedo v. de la Portilla" on Justia Law