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The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that a pretrial release officer improperly procured a warrant for plaintiff's arrest in violation of her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures. The panel held that the officer was not protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity for a defective arrest warrant where, given the similarities between his role and those of a parole officer and a law enforcement officer, his action in submitting the bare unsigned warrant should be seen as making a recommendation that the warrant be signed, just like a parole officer recommending revocation or like a police officer submitting documentation for an arrest warrant to a judge. View "Patterson v. Van Arsdel" on Justia Law

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The provision of a New York City licensing scheme (Rule 5-23), under which an individual with a "premises license" for a handgun may remove the handgun from the designated premises only for specified purposes, did not violate the Second Amendment, the Commerce Clause, the fundamental right to travel, or the First Amendment. The Second Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny and held that the burdens imposed by the Rule did not substantially affect the exercise of core Second Amendment rights, and the Rule contributed to an important state interest in public safety substantial enough to easily justify the insignificant and indirect costs it imposed on Second Amendment interests. The court also held that the Rule did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause by hindering interstate commerce; the right to travel interstate where nothing in the Rule prevented plaintiffs from engaging in intrastate or interstate travel; or the First Amendment where plaintiffs failed to demonstrate how the ability to join a specific gun club, or the ability to transport their licensed firearms to a shooting club outside of New York City, qualified as expressive association. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and for a preliminary injunction. View "New York State Rifle & Pistol Assoc. v. City of New York" on Justia Law

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The Eleventh Circuit granted a petition for panel rehearing, withdrew the previous published opinion, and substituted this opinion. The court denied the petition for review of the BIA's order affirming petitioner's removal from the United States. The court held that 8 U.S.C. 1432(a) did not discriminate based on gender where, had the situation been reversed, if petitioner's mother had become a lawful permanent resident, was naturalized, and raised him in the United States while his father remained in Jamaica, he still would not have derived citizenship because his parents never legally separated. The court also held that section 1432(a) did not unconstitutionally discriminate based on legitimacy and, in the alternative, assuming without deciding that section 1432(a)(3)'s distinction based on marital choice was a legitimacy based classification, the statute passed constitutional muster. The court agreed with its sister circuits that section 1432(a) was substantially related to protecting parental rights. Finally, section 1432(a) did not unconstitutionally burden petitioner's fundamental right to maintain a family unit. View "Levy v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

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In this appeal from a state employee grievance proceeding, a hearing officer’s decision upholding the termination of Nathan Osborn, a special agent with the Virginia Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC), was not contrary to law. ABC terminated Osburn’s employment after receiving a complaint that Osburn rummaged, without permission, through the business records of a business owner who had applied for a retail alcohol license. A hearing officer upheld Osburn’s termination, concluding that the warrantless search was not permissible, resulting in a violation of the applicant’s constitutional rights. The circuit court upheld the hearing officer’s determination. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s determination that Osborn violated the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Osburn’s warrantless inspection of the office of the applicant’s business was not permissible under the highly regulated industry exception to the warrant requirement and that the business owner did not consent to Osburn’s warrantless search of the office. View "Osburn v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court denying Appellant’s petition to change his name. Appellant, Brian Wendall Jordan, was serving a term of incarceration when he underwent a religious conversion. Appellant filed a petition to change his name to Abdul-Wakeel Mutawakkil Jordan, adding that he would not be hindered from the free exercise of his religion if not allowed to change his name. The circuit court found that Appellant’s application frustrated a legitimate law-enforcement purpose and, thus, the provisions of Va. Code 8.01-217(D) were not satisfied. Specifically, the court concluded that, due to the gravity and brutality of Defendant’s crimes, Defendant must retain his given name for the peace of mind of the victims and the victims’ families. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the basis articulated by the trial court for denying Appellant’s petition did not fall outside the scope of its broad discretion. View "Jordan v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

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Under the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement may not require an arrestee to urinate into a specimen container as a search incident to a lawful arrest without a valid warrant. Defendant was convicted and sentenced for unauthorized ingestion of a controlled substance. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence produced through chemical analysis of a urine sample that law enforcement obtained without first obtaining Defendant’s consent or a warrant. After considering an arrestee’s legitimate expectation of privacy and the government’s competing interest in preserving evidence, the Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) law enforcement may not, without a warrant, require an arrestee to provide a urine sample as a search incident to arrest; and (2) therefore, the search in this case was unconstitutional, and the circuit court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. View "State v. Lar" on Justia Law

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The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's summary judgment dismissal of plaintiff's discrimination claims against Manheim, her employer. Plaintiff alleged that the employer discriminated against her by paying her less than her male predecessor. The court held that, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, she was entitled to proceed to trial on her Equal Pay Act and Title VII claims. In this case, a jury could conclude that plaintiff was entitled to relief under the Equal Pay Act because the evidence supported a finding that she has made a prima facie case and that Manheim failed to establish an affirmative defense in response, and that plaintiff was entitled to relief under Title VII because the evidence supported a finding that her sex "was a motivating factor for" the pay disparity between her and her male predecessor. View "Bowen v. Manheim Remarketing, Inc." on Justia Law

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In 2016, Kansas sent notices of decisions to terminate its Medicaid contracts with two Planned Parenthood affiliates, Planned Parenthood of Kansas and Mid-Missouri (“PPGP”), and Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region (“PPSLR”). The notices cited concerns about the level of PPGP’s cooperation in solid-waste inspections, both Providers’ billing practices, and an anti-abortion group’s allegations that Planned Parenthood of America (“PPFA”) executives had been video-recorded negotiating the sale of fetal tissue and body parts. Together, the Providers and three individual Jane Does (“the Patients”) immediately sued Susan Mosier, Secretary of the Kansas Department of Health and Environment (“KDHE”), under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(23) and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction enjoining Kansas from terminating the Providers from the state’s Medicaid program. "States may not terminate providers from their Medicaid program for any reason they see fit, especially when that reason is unrelated to the provider’s competence and the quality of the healthcare it provides." The Tenth Circuit joined four of five circuits that addressed this same provision and affirmed the district court’s injunction prohibiting Kansas from terminating its Medicaid contract with PPGP. But the Court vacated the district court’s injunction as it pertained to PPSLR, remanding for further proceedings on that issue, because Plaintiffs failed to establish standing to challenge that termination. But on this record, the Court could not determine whether PPSLR itself could establish standing, an issue the district court declined to decide but now must decide on remand. View "Planned Parenthood v. Andersen" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Delane Hurley appealed a judgment in her action against defendants California Department of Parks and Recreation (DPR) and Leda Seals (together Defendants) that alleged, inter alia, causes of action for sexual orientation discrimination, sex discrimination, sexual harassment, retaliation, and failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, all in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), and a cause of action for violation of the Information Practices Act (“IPA”) and additionally alleged causes of action against Seals only for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED). Following trial, the jury returned verdicts in favor of Defendants on the FEHA causes of action, against Defendants on the IPA cause of action, and against Seals on the IIED and NIED causes of action. The jury awarded Hurley $19,200 for past economic damages and $19,200 for past noneconomic losses against both Defendants, and $28,800 in punitive damages against Seals only. The court denied Defendants' motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). On appeal, Hurley contended trial court erred by excluding evidence that was relevant to her FEHA causes of action. DPR and Seals challenged the judgment against them on the IPA cause of action and the trial court's denial of their JNOV motions. DPR contended: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the finding it violated the IPA; and (2) the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47(b), barred the IPA cause of action against it. Seals contended: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the finding she violated the IPA; (2) the litigation privilege barred the IPA cause of action against her; (3) the IPA cause of action was alleged under, and the jury was instructed on, a statute that was inapplicable to her; (4) there was insufficient evidence to support the findings against her on the IIED and NIED causes of action; (5) the workers' compensation exclusivity doctrine barred the IIED and NIED causes of action against her; and (6) the punitive damages award against her must be reversed for, inter alia, instructional error and insufficiency of the evidence to support it. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, except for the award of economic damages against DPR, and modified the judgment accordingly. View "Hurley v. California Dept. of Parks and Recreation" on Justia Law

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The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief to defendant with respect to his Arkansas arson conviction. The court found that trial counsel's choice not to challenge a fire investigator's testimony regarding whether defendant was a suspect in a home fire investigation did not render counsel's performance deficient. In this case, the fire marshal did not testify that defendant caused the fire, but rather that he developed defendant as a suspect based on his investigation. The court explained that the testimony was not unfounded speculation nor did it improperly usurp the providence of the jury. Furthermore, even if counsel's performance were deficient, defendant failed to establish prejudice. View "Booth v. Kelley" on Justia Law