Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In the early morning hours, Officer James Marshall observed Rodney Rucker sitting in a running car outside a hotel known for criminal activity. Marshall approached Rucker, who refused to identify himself or exit the vehicle. After additional officers arrived, they broke Rucker’s window, forcibly removed him, and arrested him. Rucker subsequently sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging unlawful seizure and arrest, First Amendment retaliation, excessive force, and bystander liability.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi denied the officers' motion for summary judgment on all claims, finding genuine disputes of material fact regarding the officers' reasonable suspicion, the alleged manufacturing of evidence, potential retaliation, and the reasonableness of the force used. The officers appealed, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court found that the bodycam footage clearly showed that Officer Marshall had reasonable suspicion to stop and question Rucker based on the time, location, and Rucker’s behavior. The court also determined that Marshall had probable cause to arrest Rucker for failing to comply with lawful commands and for operating a vehicle without displaying a driver’s license. Additionally, the court held that the officers did not use excessive force, as Rucker’s repeated refusals to comply justified their actions. Consequently, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on all claims, including the bystander liability claim against Officer Carter. The case was remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of the officers. View "Rucker v. Marshall" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Laurie DeVore, worked at the University of Kentucky from 1999 to 2022. She retired rather than comply with the University's COVID-19 test-or-vaccinate policy, which she claimed conflicted with her religious beliefs. DeVore filed a lawsuit alleging that the University violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by failing to accommodate her religious beliefs. The University had denied her requests for a hybrid work schedule and religious exemptions from the testing policy, which required unvaccinated employees to undergo weekly COVID-19 testing.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky granted summary judgment in favor of the University. The court found that DeVore did not establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination because she failed to demonstrate that the University's policy conflicted with her sincerely held religious beliefs. DeVore appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court examined whether DeVore had a sincere religious belief that conflicted with the University's testing policy. DeVore's objections to the nasal PCR tests were initially based on invasiveness, manipulation, and coercion. However, the University offered alternative testing methods, such as oral swab and saliva tests, which DeVore also rejected without providing evidence of a religious conflict with these alternatives.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that DeVore failed to establish a conflict between her religious beliefs and the University's testing policy. The court noted that DeVore's objections were largely based on personal moral codes and secular concerns rather than religious principles. Consequently, DeVore's Title VII claim did not succeed. View "DeVore v. University of Kentucky Board of Trustees" on Justia Law

Joe Baltas, a Connecticut state prisoner, was transferred to the Virginia Department of Corrections (VADOC) under the Interstate Corrections Compact. While at Red Onion State Prison (ROSP) in Virginia, Baltas alleges he was threatened by VADOC officials for filing a grievance and was later attacked by inmates, resulting in his placement in restrictive housing. He also claims that Connecticut Department of Corrections (CTDOC) officials failed to review his administrative segregation (Ad Seg) status as required, violating his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, he alleges violations of his First, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment rights due to his treatment at ROSP.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. The court found that CTDOC had adequately reviewed Baltas’s Ad Seg classification and dismissed his due process claim. It also dismissed his First, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment claims, concluding that Baltas failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court’s ruling that CTDOC’s periodic reviews of Baltas’s Ad Seg classification satisfied due process requirements. However, it found that a genuine dispute of fact existed regarding whether VADOC’s administrative remedies were available to Baltas, making summary judgment inappropriate for his First, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment claims. The court vacated the summary judgment on these claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Baltas’s remaining claims in a concurrently issued summary order. View "Baltas v. Maiga" on Justia Law

Brothers Albert Ian Schweitzer and Shawn Schweitzer sought compensation for wrongful imprisonment under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 661B, which requires proving "actual innocence." They requested investigative materials from the Hawai‘i County Police Department (HPD) and the County of Hawai‘i Office of the Prosecuting Attorney (CHOPA) to support their claim. HPD and CHOPA refused, citing an ongoing investigation.In 2023, Ian Schweitzer filed a Hawai‘i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 40 petition to vacate his conviction based on new DNA evidence pointing to another individual. The Circuit Court of the Third Circuit granted the petition, vacating Ian's conviction. Shawn Schweitzer subsequently moved to withdraw his guilty plea, which the court also granted. Both brothers then sought monetary compensation under HRS Chapter 661B, but the Attorney General stated that a finding of "actual innocence" was required.The Schweitzers filed a "Joint Petition for Relief Pursuant to HRS Chapter 661B" in their criminal proceedings, seeking a finding of actual innocence. The Circuit Court instructed them to file a motion to compel HPD to produce the investigative materials. The court granted the motion and directed the Schweitzers to prepare a subpoena. HPD filed a motion to quash the subpoena, which the court denied, leading HPD to file a writ of mandamus with the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i held that the Circuit Court had no discretion to act on the civil claims in the post-conviction proceeding and should have transferred the claims to a new civil case under HRPP Rule 40(c)(3). The court ordered the Circuit Court to quash the subpoena and transfer the Schweitzers' joint petition to a new civil proceeding, following the procedures prescribed by HRCP Rule 26 and HRS § 661B-2. The court clarified that Brady and UIPA do not apply to civil discovery and that there is no qualified law enforcement investigatory privilege in Hawai‘i. View "Hawai'i Police Department v. Kubota" on Justia Law

Estella Morris, an employee of the Central Arkansas Veterans Healthcare System (CAVHS), filed civil-rights claims against her employer, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation. Morris, who is black, claimed she was denied a promotion to Chief of Social Work Service in favor of a white colleague, Anne Wright, despite having veteran preference. Morris also alleged that her pay upgrade request was sabotaged by her supervisor, Michael Ballard, in retaliation for her previous discrimination complaints.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted summary judgment in favor of CAVHS. The court found that Morris had established a prima facie case of race discrimination but concluded that CAVHS had provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for promoting Wright—her more favorable references. The court held that Morris failed to show that this reason was a pretext for racial discrimination. Regarding the retaliation claim, the court found no evidence that Ballard's actions were causally linked to Morris's protected activities or that the person who denied the pay upgrade was aware of her discrimination complaints.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo. The appellate court affirmed the summary judgment, agreeing that Morris did not demonstrate a causal connection between her race and the promotion decision. The court also found that Morris failed to show that Ballard's alleged sabotage of her pay upgrade request was linked to her protected activities. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that CAVHS's actions were motivated by racial discrimination or retaliation. View "Morris v. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Autumn Scardina requested a cake from Masterpiece Cakeshop to celebrate her gender transition. The shop, owned by Jack Phillips, refused to make the cake, citing the message as the reason. Scardina filed a discrimination claim with the Colorado Civil Rights Division, which found probable cause of discrimination. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission took jurisdiction but later dismissed the case as part of a confidential settlement in a federal lawsuit filed by Phillips, without Scardina's participation.The district court took up Scardina's case after the Commission's dismissal and found that Phillips had violated Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), imposing a fine. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. Phillips then appealed to the Supreme Court of Colorado.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that the district court should not have heard Scardina's case. The court concluded that Scardina did not exhaust her administrative remedies as required by CADA. Specifically, the court found that Scardina should have appealed the Commission's decision to close the administrative adjudication without issuing the required order. The court vacated the lower courts' decisions and dismissed the case, stating that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter. View "In re Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc." on Justia Law

The Texas Department of Public Safety detained and arrested the appellant for criminal trespassing as part of Operation Lone Star in Maverick County. Unlike the appellant, the two women in his group were transferred to the custody of the U.S. Border Patrol. The appellant claimed selective arrest and prosecution based on his sex and sought relief through pretrial habeas proceedings.The trial court held a hearing and heard testimony from various witnesses, including DPS officers and a client advocate. The court found that the appellant, along with other adult males, was arrested for criminal trespass while the women were transferred to federal custody due to jail capacity issues. The trial court denied the appellant's pretrial writ and motion to dismiss, concluding there was no sex discrimination.The Fourth Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, held that the appellant's claim was cognizable on pretrial habeas and found that he had demonstrated a prima facie case of sex discrimination. The appellate court reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case to allow the State to rebut the presumption of sex discrimination under strict scrutiny.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and agreed that the appellant's claim was cognizable. However, the court found that the appellant failed to meet the demanding burden of showing a prima facie case of selective enforcement or prosecution. The court noted that the evidence suggested the discriminatory effect was due to logistical issues during an ongoing state of emergency, rather than intentional sex discrimination. The court reversed the appellate court's decision and affirmed the trial court's denial of relief. View "EX PARTE APARICIO" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was charged with possessing a stolen firearm and receiving a firearm while under felony indictment. Law enforcement found the stolen firearm in a vehicle owned by another individual, who later revealed that the defendant had left the gun in his car. The defendant admitted to touching the gun and knowing it was stolen. He was under felony indictment for other firearms offenses at the time.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, which argued that the statutes under which he was charged violated the Second Amendment. During jury selection, the defendant raised a Batson challenge against the prosecutor's peremptory strike of the last black juror on the panel. The district court found the prosecutor's reasons for the strike to be race-neutral and allowed it. The jury convicted the defendant on both counts, and he was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss, finding that the statutes in question were consistent with historical firearm regulations and did not violate the Second Amendment. The court also affirmed the district court's rejection of the Batson challenge, concluding that the prosecutor's race-neutral explanation for the peremptory strike was credible and not pretextual. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the defendant's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Gore" on Justia Law

In the early morning hours of July 10, 2018, Trooper Kasha Domingue stopped a vehicle. After the driver and another passenger fled, Clifton Scott Dilley exited the vehicle from the driver-side rear seat. The events that followed are disputed, but it is undisputed that Domingue shot Dilley, paralyzing him from the waist down. The incident was partially captured by a nearby security camera, which lacked audio. The footage shows Domingue pulling over the SUV, the driver exiting and interacting with Domingue, and then fleeing. Dilley then exited the vehicle, and Domingue shot him in the back.The Louisiana Department of Public Safety terminated Domingue for her actions, citing her failure to use her body camera and her false statements about the incident. Domingue initially claimed she used a taser and later fabricated a story about her defensive posture during the shooting. The Louisiana State Use of Force Board found that Domingue violated multiple policies and committed criminal negligence. She was charged with aggravated second-degree battery and illegal use of weapons, to which she pleaded guilty in 2022.Dilley sued Domingue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for using excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana denied Domingue's motion for summary judgment, finding several disputes of material fact and denying her qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that officers cannot use deadly force against a fleeing suspect who poses no immediate threat. Given the numerous factual disputes, including Domingue's inconsistent statements and the video evidence, the court found that a jury could reasonably conclude that Domingue violated clearly established law by shooting an unarmed and nonthreatening Dilley in the back without warning. The denial of qualified immunity was affirmed. View "Dilley v. Domingue" on Justia Law

Jaswinder Singh, a native of India, sought asylum in the United States, claiming persecution due to his political activities with the Mann Party, which advocates for a separate Sikh state. Singh testified that he was attacked twice by members of the opposition Indian National Congress Party (INC) in 2017 and faced threats and police inaction. He fled to the U.S. in 2018 and applied for asylum.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Singh's application, citing concerns about the credibility of his testimony due to similarities with other asylum seekers' declarations from India. The IJ also found that Singh could safely relocate within India. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing with the adverse credibility determination and the internal relocation analysis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA and IJ misapplied Matter of R-K-K-, which allows for adverse credibility determinations based on strikingly similar affidavits in unrelated proceedings. The court held that the agency erred by relying solely on non-unique factual similarities without considering linguistic or grammatical cues that would suggest plagiarism. The court also noted due process concerns, as Singh could not meaningfully address the redacted declarations used against him.Additionally, the court found that the agency's internal relocation analysis was flawed. The government failed to prove that Singh could safely engage in Mann Party activities outside of Punjab. The IJ's conclusions were based on speculation and did not adequately consider the potential for persecution by local authorities or other actors in different regions of India.The Ninth Circuit granted Singh's petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA for a renewed credibility determination and a more individualized analysis of the feasibility of internal relocation. View "SINGH V. GARLAND" on Justia Law