Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Residents of Jackson, Mississippi, brought a class action lawsuit alleging that the city knowingly contaminated their drinking water with lead, failed to treat the water to prevent lead leaching, and misled the public about the water’s safety. The complaint details how city officials ignored warnings about the water system’s vulnerabilities, failed to repair critical treatment equipment, switched water sources in a way that worsened contamination, and delayed notifying residents of dangerous lead levels. Plaintiffs claim they and their families suffered significant health effects, including lead poisoning and related medical and developmental issues, as a result of consuming the contaminated water.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi granted the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to state a substantive due process claim against the city and that the individual city officials were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims, dismissing them without prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integrity by claiming the city affirmatively introduced toxins into the water supply, misrepresented the water’s safety, and thereby deprived residents of the ability to make informed decisions about their health. The court also formally adopted the state-created danger doctrine as a viable theory in the circuit. The court reversed the dismissal of the due process claims against the city and vacated the dismissal of the state-law claims, remanding for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of claims against the individual city officials on qualified immunity grounds, finding the relevant rights were not clearly established at the time. View "Sterling v. City of Jackson" on Justia Law

Two inmates at Smith State Prison in Georgia, Miguel Jackson and Kelvin Stevenson, were involved in a prison riot on December 31, 2010, after officers discovered contraband in Jackson’s cell. The officers alleged that Jackson and Stevenson assaulted them, leading to both inmates being handcuffed and escorted away. Jackson and Stevenson claimed that, after being restrained, they were severely beaten by correctional officers. They filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia against thirty-nine officers, asserting claims of excessive force and failure to intervene under the Eighth Amendment.Over the course of more than a decade, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed many defendants, and the district court granted partial summary judgment, leaving nine officers as defendants by the time of trial. Just before jury selection, plaintiffs moved to dismiss seven more defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), which the district court granted, entering judgment in favor of those defendants and reserving the issue of costs and sanctions. The case proceeded to trial against Officers Catanzariti and Harrison. The jury found for Catanzariti on Jackson’s excessive force claim but found he failed to intervene when other officers used excessive force, awarding Jackson $1.00 in damages. Stevenson’s claims against both officers were rejected.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the plaintiffs challenged the district court’s grant of their Rule 41 motion and several evidentiary rulings. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the partial dismissal and entering judgment for the seven defendants, nor in admitting the challenged evidence. The court affirmed the district court’s final judgments. View "Jackson v. Catanzariti" on Justia Law

Several individuals, representing a class, challenged a health insurance company’s refusal to cover gender-affirming care for transgender individuals diagnosed with gender dysphoria. The company, acting as a third-party administrator for employer-sponsored, self-funded health plans, denied coverage for such treatments based on explicit plan exclusions requested by the employer sponsors. Some plaintiffs also alleged that they were denied coverage for treatments that would have been covered for other diagnoses, such as precocious puberty, but were denied solely because of the concurrent diagnosis of gender dysphoria.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington certified the class and granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The district court rejected the company’s arguments that it was not subject to Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act because its third-party administrator activities were not federally funded, that it was merely following employer instructions under ERISA, and that it was shielded by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The district court also found that the exclusions constituted sex-based discrimination under Section 1557.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the company is subject to Section 1557, that ERISA does not require administrators to enforce unlawful plan terms, and that RFRA does not provide a defense in this context. However, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court’s analysis of sex-based discrimination was undermined by the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in United States v. Skrmetti, which clarified the application of sex discrimination standards to exclusions for gender dysphoria treatment. The Ninth Circuit vacated the summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to consider whether, under Skrmetti, the exclusions at issue may still constitute unlawful discrimination, particularly in cases involving pretext or proxy discrimination or where plaintiffs had other qualifying diagnoses. View "PRITCHARD V. BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF ILLINOIS" on Justia Law

Three men were prosecuted for their roles in the fatal shooting of Ahmaud Arbery, a Black man, in the Satilla Shores neighborhood of Glynn County, Georgia. On February 23, 2020, Arbery was running through the neighborhood and stopped at a house under construction, which he had visited before. Gregory and Travis McMichael, who lived nearby, saw Arbery and, suspecting him of recent burglaries, armed themselves and pursued him in a truck. William Bryan, a neighbor, joined the chase in his own vehicle. The men used their trucks to block and pursue Arbery through public streets, ultimately leading to a confrontation in which Travis McMichael shot and killed Arbery.After being convicted of murder and other charges in Georgia state court and sentenced to life imprisonment, the defendants were tried in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. There, they were convicted of interference with rights under 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B), attempted kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), and, for the McMichaels, firearm offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). The district court denied their motions for acquittal, finding sufficient evidence that the defendants acted because of Arbery’s race and his use of public streets, that the streets were provided or administered by the county, and that the attempted kidnapping was for a benefit and involved an instrumentality of interstate commerce.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. The court held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s findings on all challenged elements, including racial motivation, use of public facilities, and use of an automobile as an instrumentality of interstate commerce. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed all convictions. View "USA v. Bryan" on Justia Law

The case involves claims brought by the parents of a minor child, P.F., who was allegedly bullied, harassed, and assaulted by another student at Clay Elementary School during the 2022–2023 school year due to his sexual orientation. The parents assert that the school district and three employees were aware of these incidents but failed to protect P.F. or notify his parents, instead blaming P.F. or dismissing the other student’s conduct. After removing P.F. from the school and filing reports with authorities, the parents pursued legal action, first filing a complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (ICRC), which issued a right-to-sue letter. The parents then filed an amended petition in the Iowa District Court for Polk County, asserting three claims under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) and three common law tort claims.The defendants moved to dismiss all claims, arguing that the heightened pleading requirements and qualified immunity provisions of the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA), as amended by Iowa Code section 670.4A, applied. The Iowa District Court for Polk County denied the motion, finding that the ICRA claims were not torts subject to the IMTCA and that the common law claims met the IMTCA’s pleading standard. The defendants appealed, asserting a right to immediate appeal under section 670.4A(4).The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the appeal and held that the IMTCA’s qualified immunity and heightened pleading requirements do not apply to claims brought under the ICRA or to common law tort claims, as clarified in Doe v. Western Dubuque Community School District. Because section 670.4A did not apply to any of the claims, the defendants were not entitled to an appeal as of right. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction and remanded the case. View "Fogle v. Clay Elementary School-Southeast Polk Community School District" on Justia Law

While incarcerated at High Desert State Prison in Clark County, Brian Caperonis was killed by other inmates. His father, William Joseph Caperonis, acting individually and as the special administrator of Brian’s estate, filed a civil complaint against the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) and several of its employees. The claims included civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, wrongful death, and various negligence claims related to Brian’s death.NDOC moved to dismiss the state law negligence claims, arguing that the estate had failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by NRS 41.0322 and NRS 209.243. NDOC asserted that, as the estate stands in the shoes of the decedent, it was required to file an administrative claim before pursuing litigation. William opposed, contending that the exhaustion requirement applied only to living inmates and not to the estates of deceased prisoners. The Eighth Judicial District Court denied NDOC’s motion to dismiss, finding that the plain language of the statutes and the relevant administrative regulations did not extend the exhaustion requirement to estates of deceased inmates.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed NDOC’s petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that the administrative exhaustion requirements in NRS 41.0322 and NRS 209.243 do not apply to the estate of a deceased prisoner. The court reasoned that the statutory language is limited to “a person who is or was” in NDOC custody and does not contemplate survival claims by estates. The court also found that the administrative regulations provide no mechanism for an estate to pursue such remedies. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Nevada denied NDOC’s writ petition, affirming the district court’s decision. View "Department of Corrections v. District Court" on Justia Law

An 18-year-old individual was convicted of second degree felony murder and sentenced to 300 months in prison, with an offender score that included a prior drug possession conviction. The court also imposed over $7,000 in restitution to the Crime Victims Compensation fund, covering part of the victim’s funeral expenses. Years later, following the Washington Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Blake, which invalidated certain drug possession convictions, the individual’s prior conviction was vacated, reducing his offender score and lowering his sentencing range. At the resentencing hearing, the individual specifically requested that the court consider his youth at the time of the offense as a mitigating factor. The resentencing judge declined to do so, stating that the issue of youthfulness was not relevant to the hearing and could be raised elsewhere, and imposed a sentence within the new standard range as recommended by defense counsel.The Washington Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that, although the resentencing judge had discretion to consider youth as a mitigating factor, any error in failing to do so was harmless because the sentence imposed matched the defense’s request. The Court of Appeals also found that the restitution order was not constitutionally excessive, as it was compensatory rather than punitive.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reversed the Court of Appeals in part. It held that the resentencing court abused its discretion by failing to meaningfully consider the individual’s youthfulness when specifically asked, as required by precedent. The court clarified that while a judge is not required to impose a lower sentence due to youth, the judge must at least consider it as a mitigating factor. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the restitution was not excessive, as it was solely compensatory. The case was remanded for a new resentencing hearing. View "State v. Ellis" on Justia Law

A two-year-old child, M.B., was placed with foster parents who are members of an Old Order Amish community shortly after his birth. The foster parents had previously adopted M.B.’s three biological sisters, who also reside in their home. Concerns were raised by M.B.’s guardian ad litem regarding the suitability of this placement, primarily because the Amish foster parents would limit M.B.’s formal education to eighth grade, consistent with their religious beliefs. Additional concerns included the lack of regular pediatric care, limited vaccination, restricted exposure to technology, and the potential for racial non-acceptance within the Amish community, as M.B. is biracial.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County reviewed a motion by the guardian ad litem to remove M.B. from the foster home. The court considered evidence and testimony, including the foster father’s statements about education, medical care, and community acceptance. The court also reviewed a special commissioner’s report, which acknowledged the loving and stable environment provided by the foster parents but noted potential limitations related to education, healthcare, and cultural exposure. Ultimately, the circuit court denied the motion to remove M.B., finding that the foster home was stable, loving, and in the child’s best interests, and that the court could not discriminate against the family based on religion or lifestyle.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the Foster Child Bill of Rights does not mandate removal from a placement solely because one or more statutory rights may be limited, but instead requires a best-interest-of-the-child analysis considering all relevant factors. The court found that the circuit court’s findings were supported by the record and that M.B.’s placement with the Amish foster parents did not violate his statutory or constitutional rights. View "In re M.B." on Justia Law

A resident of University Heights, Ohio, who practices Orthodox Judaism, sought to use his home for group prayer sessions due to religious obligations and restrictions on travel during the Sabbath. After inviting neighbors to participate in these gatherings, a neighbor complained to city officials, prompting the city’s law director to send a cease-and-desist letter, warning that using the home as a place of religious assembly violated local zoning laws. The resident then applied for a special use permit to operate a house of worship but withdrew his application before the city’s Planning Commission could reach a decision, stating he did not wish to operate a house of worship as defined by the ordinance. Despite withdrawing, he later filed a federal lawsuit against the city and several officials, alleging violations of federal and state law, including constitutional and statutory claims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted summary judgment for the city and its officials. The court found that the plaintiff’s claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Ohio Constitution were unripe because there was no final decision by the relevant local authorities regarding the application of the zoning ordinance to his property. The court also rejected his Fourth Amendment and Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE Act) claims on the merits and declined supplemental jurisdiction over a state public records claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court held that most of the plaintiff’s claims were unripe because he withdrew his application before any final decision was made by the city’s zoning authorities, and thus there was no concrete dispute for federal review. The court also held that his facial challenges to the ordinance were forfeited and, in any event, failed as a matter of law. The court further concluded that the Fourth Amendment and FACE Act claims failed on the merits and found no abuse of discretion in declining supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim. View "Daniel Grand v. City of University Heights, Ohio" on Justia Law

Skye Angel Anne Hennon filed a sworn petition in the Judith Basin Justice Court seeking a temporary order of protection against Matthew Weber for herself, her minor son N.G., and Brian Gonzalez. Hennon alleged that Weber had harassed and stalked her through threatening messages and uninvited visits, and referenced a separate legal dispute in Idaho. The Justice Court issued a temporary order of protection and scheduled a hearing, at which both parties appeared and testified. During the hearing, Weber attempted to cross-examine Hennon, but the court allowed Hennon to decline answering a relevant question and ended the cross-examination. Weber presented his own testimony and attempted to submit exhibits, which the court excluded as hearsay. The Justice Court extended the order of protection for Hennon and N.G. for one year.Weber appealed to the Montana Tenth Judicial District Court, which affirmed the order of protection for Hennon and N.G., but dismissed it as to Gonzalez, noting that Gonzalez, as an adult, needed to seek his own order. The District Court acknowledged deficiencies in the record, including unclear admitted exhibits and unintelligible audio, but relied on the Justice Court’s position to observe the parties and testimony.Weber then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana. The Supreme Court held that the Justice Court abused its discretion and violated Weber’s procedural due process rights by denying him a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine Hennon on central factual issues. The Court also found that the District Court abused its discretion by affirming the order of protection despite an incomplete and unclear record. The Supreme Court vacated both lower courts’ orders and remanded the case to the Justice Court for a new evidentiary hearing consistent with statutory and due process requirements. View "Hennon v. Weber" on Justia Law