Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Joshua Steeb was severely injured after intervening to save his friend, Teresa Fitzgerald, from a violent dog attack at the home of Linda Motter, Fitzgerald’s relative. The dog, known for its aggressive history and previously quarantined by local authorities, was reported to animal control for removal. Officer Mike Ehart, aware of the dog’s past behavior, arrived on the scene but instead of personally handling the dog, he instructed Fitzgerald to retrieve and secure the animal in his truck. Despite Fitzgerald’s apprehension and knowledge of the dog’s dangerous tendencies, she attempted the task and was attacked. Steeb’s attempt to rescue her resulted in the dog mauling him, causing permanent injuries.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan reviewed Steeb’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which were based on the “state-created-danger” theory of substantive due process. Steeb argued that Officer Ehart’s conduct created or increased the risk that led to the attack and that the City of Battle Creek failed to properly train and equip Ehart. The district court dismissed all federal claims, finding that Steeb had not alleged a plausible constitutional violation. As a result, the court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the related state law claims, dismissing them without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that Steeb failed to plausibly allege that Officer Ehart took an “affirmative act” sufficient to invoke the state-created-danger doctrine, primarily because Fitzgerald voluntarily assumed the risk of handling the dangerous dog. Without a constitutional violation, the municipal liability claim against the City of Battle Creek also failed. The appellate court thus affirmed the dismissal of Steeb’s claims. View "Steeb v. Ehart" on Justia Law

While serving a portion of his sentence at the Federal Correctional Complex in Terre Haute, Indiana, Derek Thomas was repeatedly assaulted by his cellmate, suffering serious physical and psychological harm. Thomas initially sought protective custody after other inmates threatened him due to his conviction as a sex offender. Despite being placed in the Special Housing Unit, he experienced continued threats, food tampering, and was eventually housed with an inmate who violently assaulted and allegedly raped him. Thomas reported these incidents through notes to prison staff and verbally to counselors and psychologists, yet he was not removed from his cell until after the alleged rape. Following his removal, Thomas sought medical and psychological care, but claims his injuries and trauma were not adequately addressed.After filing a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Thomas was allowed to proceed with claims that certain prison officials failed to protect him and were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, both in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment, raising qualified immunity as a defense. Thomas’s counsel did not address qualified immunity in the response to the motion, and Thomas later confirmed reliance on counsel’s submission. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding Thomas’s claims either presented a new Bivens context not recognized by precedent or failed because Thomas did not overcome the qualified immunity defense.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Thomas’s failure-to-protect claim could not proceed because it sought to expand Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics beyond existing precedent. Regarding the deliberate indifference claim, the court held that Thomas forfeited his opposition to qualified immunity by not raising it in the district court and did not meet the criteria for appellate review of a forfeited argument. View "Thomas v. Carmichael" on Justia Law

Louis Alford was stopped by Cannon County Sheriff’s Deputies outside Woodbury, Tennessee for minor traffic violations. During the stop, Deputy Deffendoll observed a syringe filled with clear liquid inside Alford’s truck. A subsequent search revealed additional empty syringes, powder in a baggie, paper with residue, empty baggies, prescription pills not belonging to either occupant, and digital scales. Alford was arrested and charged with three state drug offenses. He spent time in jail, and his parole was revoked, resulting in over a year in prison. The drug charges were later dismissed. Forensic analysis showed the powder contained methamphetamine, but other items either contained noncontrolled substances or were not tested.Alford filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against Deputies Deffendoll and Smith, and Cannon County, asserting false arrest, malicious prosecution, and Monell liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the federal claims, finding no genuine issue of material fact as to Smith’s involvement, and that Deffendoll had probable cause for arrest and prosecution. The court also rejected the Monell claim, finding no underlying constitutional deprivation. Alford appealed only the federal claims.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The court held that Smith was not personally involved in the arrest, and Deffendoll had probable cause to arrest and charge Alford for simple possession and possession of drug paraphernalia. The court applied the proper summary judgment and qualified immunity standards, and clarified that probable cause existed for the charges that led to Alford’s seizure. Without a constitutional violation, Alford’s Monell claim failed. The court affirmed summary judgment for all defendants. View "Alford v. Deffendoll" on Justia Law

Michael Victor was detained overnight in an Otsego County, Michigan jail after being arrested for disorderly conduct and resisting an officer. Victor, who has epilepsy, did not receive his prescribed anti-seizure medication while in custody, despite his mother delivering it to the jail and officers being informed of his medical needs. The jail’s procedures required officers to contact an on-call medical provider from Advanced Correctional Healthcare (ACH) before administering any medication. After his release the next morning, Victor suffered a seizure, resulting in significant injuries.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan heard Victor’s civil rights suit against ACH and Nurse Kimberly Reynolds. At trial, Victor presented evidence including testimony from officers and medical staff, but no one recalled making or receiving a call to ACH regarding his medication, and no records indicated any such contact. The jury found in favor of Reynolds but against ACH, awarding Victor economic, noneconomic, and punitive damages. ACH moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, arguing insufficient evidence that any officer contacted ACH. The district court granted ACH’s motions, holding there was not enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find that contact occurred, and also denied Victor’s request for sanctions related to alleged discovery violations.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed whether Victor had presented sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that an officer had contacted ACH about his medication needs. The court held that the absence of any records and the lack of recollection from all involved witnesses meant Victor had not met his burden. Testimony indicating intent to call, without corroboration, was not enough. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment as a matter of law for ACH and found no abuse of discretion in denying sanctions. View "Victor v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated battery of a police officer following an incident at Longview Park in Rock Island, Illinois. The events began after the defendant’s ex-wife contacted police out of concern for their daughter’s welfare, based on alarming statements made by the defendant. Police arrived and, after deciding the child should leave with her mother, the defendant became upset and tried to approach his daughter, prompting police intervention. An altercation ensued: one officer pushed the defendant, who pushed the officer’s arm away, and another officer tackled the defendant, after which the defendant wrapped his arm around the officer’s neck. The defendant was charged based on these physical contacts.The case was tried in the Circuit Court of Rock Island County. During trial, the defendant requested the jury be instructed on self-defense, arguing his actions were a response to excessive force by the officers. The court denied this request, finding the evidence did not support each element required for a self-defense instruction. The jury acquitted the defendant of battery against one officer but convicted him as to the other. The defendant’s posttrial motion challenging the lack of a self-defense instruction was denied.On appeal, the Appellate Court, Fourth District, affirmed the conviction, applying a two-step inquiry: first, whether there was sufficient evidence of excessive force by police, and second, whether all six elements of self-defense were supported. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in refusing the instruction, focusing on the defendant’s subjective belief element.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case to resolve a conflict among appellate courts regarding self-defense instructions in cases involving alleged excessive police force. The court held that the long-standing six-element test for self-defense applies, and found there was some evidence for each element in the record. The trial court abused its discretion by refusing the instruction. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ judgments and remanded for further proceedings. View "People v. Vesey" on Justia Law

A probation officer with the Cook County Juvenile Probation Department alleged that her supervisors created a racially hostile work environment, culminating in her termination for performance issues and insubordination. She cited several workplace incidents, including the enforcement of a no-children-in-the-workplace policy, reprimands related to her work product and interactions with colleagues, and a 2016 meeting where the department director, while reading from a document, said the N-word in front of African American employees (an incident the plaintiff learned about secondhand). The plaintiff’s children occasionally waited in her office after school, and she was reminded of the policy prohibiting this practice. She also disagreed with supervisors over the content of reports submitted to the court, and she was ultimately terminated after an internal investigation found repeated insubordination and issues regarding her communications with clients and the court.The plaintiff first challenged her termination through union arbitration but lost. She then brought a lawsuit under Title VII in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging that her employer subjected her to a race-based hostile work environment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of her employer, concluding that the incidents cited, even when considered together, were not sufficiently severe or pervasive as required by Title VII, nor did the plaintiff demonstrate that the alleged harassment was based on race.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiff did not present evidence of harassment that was severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of employment, nor did she establish that the alleged conduct was based on race. The court also found no error in the exclusion of late-disclosed witness testimony. The judgment for the employer was affirmed. View "Jones v. Das" on Justia Law

While detained at the Hancock County Jail in Indiana, Nicholas Zemlick underwent an elective abdominal surgery. Following his return to the jail, he developed an abdominal infection, experiencing worsening symptoms over several days. Jail medical staff monitored and treated him, ultimately prescribing antibiotics and arranging for a hospital transport after a nurse expressed concern about his condition. Zemlick underwent emergency surgery, recovered, and returned to the jail, where his wound continued to heal without further complications.Zemlick filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana against the Hancock County Sheriff and two jail officers, alleging violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to his medical needs. He also brought a Monell claim, asserting that the Sheriff failed to ensure adequate medical resources and training at the jail. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants on the federal claims, finding no genuine dispute of material fact and relinquished jurisdiction over state-law claims. Zemlick subsequently settled with the medical staff defendants, leaving only the claims against the Sheriff and two officers for appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment order de novo. The appellate court held that the individual defendants did not violate Zemlick’s Fourteenth Amendment rights, either because the claims failed on the merits or because the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, as their conduct was not clearly established as unlawful. Regarding the Monell claim, the court found Zemlick’s theories were waived under district court procedures and unsupported by the record. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Zemlick v. Burkhart" on Justia Law

The case concerns a California statute that makes it a crime to knowingly file a false allegation of police misconduct and requires complainants to sign an advisory warning of potential criminal liability before their complaint is accepted. The Los Angeles Police Protective League sought an injunction compelling the City of Los Angeles to enforce this advisory requirement. The City had previously entered into a consent decree with the federal government prohibiting enforcement of the advisory, and even after the consent decree expired, continued not to require the advisory due to concerns about the statute’s constitutionality.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, relying on the California Supreme Court’s earlier decision in People v. Stanistreet, granted the injunction and ordered the City to require the statutory advisory. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, adhering to Stanistreet’s reasoning that had upheld the statute’s constitutionality. The City then petitioned to the Supreme Court of California, arguing that subsequent federal decisions—especially Chaker v. Crogan by the Ninth Circuit—cast serious doubt on the continuing validity of Stanistreet and the constitutionality of the statute.Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of California reconsidered its prior Stanistreet decision in light of more recent U.S. Supreme Court rulings, including United States v. Alvarez and Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton. The court held that the statutory scheme—combining criminal penalties with a mandatory and prominently worded advisory—created a consequential risk of chilling truthful or well-intentioned complaints of police misconduct. The court concluded that this risk triggered heightened constitutional scrutiny under the First Amendment. The statute failed intermediate scrutiny because it was not narrowly tailored and burdened substantially more speech than necessary to serve the state’s legitimate interests. The court therefore reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal. View "L.A. Police Protective League v. City of L.A." on Justia Law

A Kansas man was convicted in 2009 for the murder of a woman, Kathleen, but was acquitted of killing her husband, Carl. After spending twelve years in prison, he was exonerated when evidence emerged showing Kathleen had killed both herself and her husband, framing him for the crime. The exonerated man died shortly after his release. His widow, as executor of his estate, filed a federal civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations by the police during the investigation that led to his conviction. Specifically, the claims against the two lead detectives included fabrication and suppression of evidence (Count I) and malicious prosecution (Count II).The United States District Court for the District of Kansas denied the detectives’ motion for summary judgment on both counts, rejecting their assertion of qualified immunity. The district court found that a jury could conclude the detectives withheld material exculpatory evidence, failed to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence, and fabricated inculpatory evidence. The court also found that a reasonable jury could determine the detectives acted at least recklessly, and that clear legal precedent established the officers’ obligations. The district court further denied summary judgment to the Unified Government (the detectives’ employer) on municipal liability claims, because those claims depended on the detectives’ alleged constitutional violations.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed only the legal questions related to qualified immunity. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on both counts, concluding the estate’s claims were supported by controlling law and sufficient factual allegations. The Tenth Circuit dismissed the Unified Government’s appeal for lack of pendent appellate jurisdiction, since it did not independently resolve the underlying constitutional claims. View "Coones v. Board of County Commissioners" on Justia Law

Solomon Jones, acting without an attorney, brought a civil rights lawsuit in federal court against several local government entities in Illinois. He alleged that his constitutional rights had been violated during a series of events in 2023, including his being ticketed and arrested for trespassing and disorderly conduct. Subsequent to filing his lawsuit, Jones filed multiple motions, including one requesting the district judge’s recusal.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois denied Jones’s motion for recusal. Acting on its own initiative, the court also determined it should abstain from hearing Jones’s claims under the doctrine established in Younger v. Harris, because a related state criminal case was still pending. The district court stayed the federal case, instructing Jones to provide a status update after the conclusion of the state proceedings. While this appeal was pending, Jones notified the court that he had been acquitted in the state criminal case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of the recusal motion, as no final judgment had been entered. However, it found the stay order based on Younger abstention was immediately appealable. Since the state court proceedings had ended, the appellate court held that the basis for abstention no longer existed. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s stay order and remanded the case for further proceedings, directing the district court to address any new developments, such as additional state charges Jones reported, and determine their relevance to the federal case. View "Jones v. Kankakee County Sheriff's Department" on Justia Law